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Section 1: Purpose, Methodology, Literature Review and Structure 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Statelessness is a reality for between twelve to fourteen million people globally according to 
the United Nations (UN) (UN, 2014: internet). People who do not have the nationality of any 
state are considered stateless and this category is distinct from other ‘non-citizen’ groups 
such as illegal immigrants, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and refugees (Manby, 
2011: 6). In an international environment which recognises and prioritises the provision of 
fundamental rights to all individuals regardless of race, gender, religion or ethnicity, the 
increasing number of stateless people globally is an unacceptable predicament that requires 
immediate measures. 
Citizenship is the main legal mechanism through which a bond between an individual and 
state exists (Walker, 1981: 107). Despite stateless individuals not having a state that they are 
legally bound to, these people often have many linkages to the states they find themselves in 
and consider to be their home. By denying the stateless recognised relations with a state, their 
dignity and existence is undermined as they officially do not exist. More importantly, 
nationality or citizenship is often a prerequisite for the enjoyment of rights and political 
participation, even in the realm of international human rights which are meant to apply to all 
people (Blitz & Lynch, 2009: 22). Important rights that stateless people are often denied 
include the right to vital services such as health and education as well as the ability to vote, 
find employment and own property (Wright, 2009: 22). 
However, another characteristic of the stateless is that they exist, conceptually at least, 
outside of the current context of sovereign states. Their existence, or inclusion through 
exclusion, creates a space for contesting the dominance and legitimacy of the state system 
(Rancier, 2004: 300). The stateless create “a dispute about what they exactly entail and whom 
they concern in which cases (Rancier, 2004: 303).  The precarity of stateless existence cannot 
be denied. That said, there is potentiality in precarity to challenge the status quo and possibly 
create the emergence of new types of membership, inclusion and recognition.  
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1.2. The Purpose of the Study 
 
In light of the above, the purpose of this research report is to understand the emergence of 
statelessness and interrogate: it’s consequences on the rights of stateless individuals, the role 
of the state as the primary conferrer of rights and the international legal framework regarding 
fundamental human rights. In particular the research report aims to investigate the nature and 
purpose of citizenship and the consequence thereof for stateless people who do not have 
citizenship and subsequently substantive enjoyment of socio-economic, political and civil 
rights. If stateless people are essentially rightless, as argued by Hannah Arendt (Tubb, 2006: 
40), then it follows that their obligations or incentives to observe domestic and international 
norms and law differ from those who are legally acknowledged and protected by said law. 
This research essay will also explore questions of the revolutionary potential of statelessness 
as a means of acting outside of and against the state. This will be done by analysing the type 
of political subject that is created by the precarity of statelessness. 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
The main research question is to investigate the precarity and revolutionary potentiality of 
statelessness with regards to the relationship between statelessness and sovereignty. There are 
a number of sub-questions that have to be asked and analysed in order to adequately address 
the main research question. These include: 
i. What is citizenship and what are the general requirements for its conferral? 
ii. What rights and responsibilities do stateless people have? 
iii. What are the main causes of statelessness? 
iv. Why and how do states deny certain people citizenship? 
v. Do stateless individuals have the substantive enjoyment of rights? 
vi. Why has the international legal framework failed to protect the rights of stateless 
individuals? 
vii. What alternatives exist for the provision of rights outside the state? 
1.4. Methodology 
 
This research report will utilise mainly secondary qualitative literature on citizenship, 
sovereignty and statelessness. In order to clarify and emphasise certain points, examples will 
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be used from numerous case-studies. As noted by Batcher (1995: 232), the nature of 
statelessness is different depending on its causes and the region in which stateless people find 
themselve, for example, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Crimean Tatars in Ukraine and the hundreds of 
thousands recently deemed stateless in the Dominican Republic. In order to illuminate as 
many of the different characteristics of statelessness as possible without being restricted to 
one or two particular case studies, many examples from all over the world will be used. This 
will also bolster the legitimacy of making generalisations as to the role of the state in the 
emergence of statelessness and the political agency of the stateless without having to restrict 
the findings to particular case studies. 
There is a slight comparative element to the research report. As Mills et al (2006: 621) note, 
an underlying goal of comparative analysis is to shed light on similarities and differences. It 
is important then, when conducting a comparative study, to keep variables of interest constant 
across case studies in order to make efficient comparison possible. In particular the research 
report will be concerned with conditions under which people become stateless, their 
experience of their statelessness and the role of the state in acknowledging, addressing and 
perpetuating the problem.  
1.5. Literature Review 
 
There has been a large amount of research conducted into different aspects of citizenship 
such as the challenges of inclusive citizenship, citizenship and compulsory military service, 
women’s experience of citizenship, citizenship and political participation, social citizenship 
and much more. The experience of non-citizens has also been explored in depth with a focus 
on refugees and legal and illegal migrants and their experiences in education, health, law 
enforcement and local politics. In particular, there have been efforts to describe the 
discrimination and exploitation these individuals face and suggestions made on how reform 
may take place. These studies overwhelmingly focus on refugees and migrants and largely 
ignore the stateless which, as mentioned earlier, are a distinct and separate group of non-
citizens. The experiences of stateless people as a particular group of non-citizen has been 
largely under researched and investigated. 
The dominant research that has been done regarding statelessness has been undertaken from a 
legal perspective by lawyers and human rights activists who are concerned with the growing 
number of individuals who lack fundamental entitlements and mechanism through which to 
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require assistance. In South Africa, Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) conducted an 
extensive study (2013) aimed at understanding the way in which South Africa’s and other 
African countries’ legal frameworks have allowed for the emergence of statelessness and 
developing recommendations for legal reform. Similarly, the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2007, 2009), UN General Assembly (1948, 1954, 
1961, 2007) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2008, 
2009) also focus almost exclusively on the legal loopholes or shortcomings that assist the 
proliferation of stateless individuals globally and the need for states to reform to ensure the 
protection of all individuals i.e. nationals and non-nationals. All these agencies are aware of 
the fundamental rights that stateless individuals are deprived of and seek to assist through the 
legal reformation of defaulting political systems regarding citizenship. 
Thus activism towards understanding and reducing instances of statelessness has come from 
the international legal framework committed to enforcing the fundamental human rights of 
all. Therefore, a study of statelessness must seek to interrogate and understand international 
law. The international legal framework on statelessness includes the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Related Conventions that are 
relevant to stateless individuals include the 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women, the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
Statelessness has racial, ethnic and gender dimensions. As one can probably tell from the 
titles of the relevant conventions, women, children and ethnic minorities make up the largest 
component of all stateless people.  
What is interesting about both the UN and African Union (AU) responses to statelessness is 
the lack of interrogation of the state-form as a cause of statelessness. They focus almost 
exclusively on discriminatory legal practices which allow for discrimination and exclusion to 
occur without interacting with the systemic. Both the UN and the AU are constituted of states 
and both institutions highlight sovereignty of states as their basis of engagement and co-
operation. It is unlikely that a statist critique regarding statelessness would emerge from this 
type of analysis. Furthermore, it is no surprise that the revolutionary potential of the stateless 
individual to disrupt the status quo has not been a focus of analysis here as well. However, 
Comment [LH1]: Something 
missiing after ‘systemic’? 
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the acknowledgement of statelessness as a category and efforts to respond to statelessness, be 
they statist and/or inadequate reveal those regional and international institutions are aware of 
the fact that the stateless cannot be ignored.  
Although it was mentioned earlier that statelessness is a distinct sub-group within the group 
of non-citizens, most of the research on statelessness has been conducted under the broad 
group of ‘non-citizens’ (Blitz & Lynch, 2009; Sokoloff, 2005; UNHCR, 2008; Weissbrodt, 
2003). As a result, a substantial amount of the literature used may not pertain to stateless 
individuals directly. However this literature is still important as it represents the international 
framework in which statelessness is acknowledged, researched and analysed. 
There is a further distinction made in the literature between de facto and de jure stateless 
individuals. The former refers to individuals who have no documentation or other proof of 
their relation to a state whereas the latter refers to those on which citizenship has never been 
bestowed (Weis, 1979: 184). Although the experience of these two dimensions of 
statelessness are likely to be similar, the distinction is still important as certain protective 
measures such as the UN 1954 Convention on Statelessness only apply to de jure stateless 
individuals. 
In the analysis on whether or not statelessness individuals are essentially rightless, as argued 
by Arendt (1973), I will consider not whether stateless people legally have rights but rather 
whether they have substantive enjoyment of rights. A fundamental marker of whether or not 
one can derive substantive value from rights is whether or not one has access to recourse for 
being denied rights by institutions such as courts. This is an important aspect of the position 
that the research will take and this position will be further justified in the discussion on moral 
and legal entitlements as well as the critique of human rights.  
There are three main aspects to the theoretical framework that the research report will 
employ. These are the theories of citizenship, theories of statelessness and theories pertaining 
to the sovereignty of the modern state. There are two main dimensions of citizenship theory. 
The first is the rights that citizens are entitled to as a result of their relationship to the state. 
The second is the consequent duties that are imposed on individuals as a result of their 
membership in the state and the rights that are conferred on them. Citizenship theory is 
relevant to this research essay because in most cases stateless people have been denied 
citizenship by states and exist in a state of limbo.  Modern citizenship theory is going to form 
a core part of the essay’s understanding of citizenship. This is inclusive of different 
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theoretical perspectives of citizenship such as the civic-republican model and liberal model 
which have areas of both agreement and disagreement regarding citizenship. Kymlicka and 
Norman (1994: 353) acknowledge that citizenship is crucial to understanding the link 
between individual’s entitlements on the one hand and an attachment to a community on the 
other. Thus, the lack of attachment to a community for stateless individuals has an important 
impact on not only the entitlement of stateless individuals to particular socio-economic, 
political and civil rights but also their interconnection and assimilation into the communities 
in which they find themselves.  
Theories of rights and human rights are critical to the discussion of i) what rights stateless 
individuals are entitled to, ii) who should provide those rights and their protection and iii) 
whether human rights are sufficient as the only rights granted to stateless individuals. In 
particular, this report is interested in natural rights, legal rights and human rights. Rights can 
be legal, social, institutional, negative or positive. This distinction is made clear by Coleman 
(1986), Eleftheriadis (2007) and Waldron (1989). I will use Locke’s theory of natural rights 
which insists that the state must exist before rights are conferred as well as the legal positivist 
theory of rights that only acknowledges those rights codified in law.  
Human rights which are said to be universal and inalienable are also central to the thesis of 
the precariousness and/or rightlessness of statelessness. The entrenchment of these rights in 
various UN agreements, conventions and provisions has led some to argue that human rights 
are an entrenched part of international society. Thus, if all people have the right to nationality 
i.e. citizenship, then statelessness is a violation of both domestic and international law. In 
respect of this literature, this research essay will contend that stateless individuals are indeed 
rightless as argued by Hannah Arendt (1973). The existence of inalienable and universal 
human rights might seem to contradict the assertion that rightless individuals exist within an 
international legal framework that ensures that all individuals have at minimum human rights. 
However, this research essay will argue that rights are enjoyed to the extent that they are 
protected by an institution that has the ability to defend their provision. The numerous human 
rights violations globally is proof that the UN has serious shortcomings as an agency tasked 
with the protection of rights of individuals especially in instances where states are 
purposefully withholding citizenship and thus the “right to have rights” from certain groups 
and individuals. The preeminent authority of human rights is challenged by the failure of 
international institutions to create a capacitated body such as the state to protect rights 
through the use of or threat of use of force. 
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Hence, the research report is concerned with ‘real rights’. By real rights, I mean rights that 
are legally codified, defendable and protected by an institution with the capacity to ensure 
they are provided for, i.e. substantive rights. As Bentham (1987: 69) notes, only substantive 
rights guarantee protection; other forms of rights such as natural and universal human rights 
merely represent “imprescriptable natural rights” or “rhetorical nonsense.”  
With the increasing number of stateless individuals, there has been an increase in the 
literature particularly pertaining to stateless people. There are those who are concerned with 
the relationship between statelessness and international law (Batcher, 2006; van Waas, 2008; 
Walker, 1981; Weis, 1979). These studies generally aim to understand why the identification 
of statelessness as a global problem has failed to lead to the phenomenon’s reduction 
specifically through international law. 
There has been more general analysis of the relationship between citizenship and rights 
(Adejumobi, 2001; Ali, 2006; Bhabha, 1998; Blitz and Lynch, 2009; Elphick & George, 
2013; Southwick and Lynch, 2009 and Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). As Elphick and George 
(2013:v) aptly note, rights are often unenforceable without nationality. Therefore the 
relationship between citizenship and rights is crucial to understand the reality of those 
ostracised from that relationship. 
Statelessness often occurs as a loss of citizenship. Alenikoff (1986), Bahar (2007) and 
Samore (1951) look specifically at the reasons why citizenship may be revoked, the resultant 
deprivation experienced by ex-citizens and the problems with conflicting domestic nationality 
laws. Manby (2011) and Tubb (2006) research the problem of lost citizenship in Southern 
Africa and Colombia respectively. 
Hannah Arendt’s (1973) thoughts on the rightlessness of the stateless are elaborated on by 
Bernstein (2005) and Wright (2009). Essentially what this literature seek to argue is that 
stateless individuals are invisible within current political systems which fail not only to 
bestow on the stateless substantive rights but also to recognise them as worthy individuals, 
contributing as an essential part of society. Arendt’s assertion that the stateless are those who 
have the right to have no rights is extremely powerful in shedding light on the devastation 
and deprivation that usually characterise statelessness.  It further has important consequences 
for understanding the agency of stateless individuals and the extent to which they can utilise 
their capabilities in a political system that excludes them. Agamben (1995, 1998 and 2005) 
provides a critique of human rights, reformulates Arendt with the inclusion of Foucault’s 
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notion of biopolitics and concludes that not only is statelessness a position of deep precarity, 
it is a position of precarity that can never be escaped from. Although many have critiqued 
Agamben as being nilhist, De Boever (2006) and Schaap (2012) show how in fact his work 
can be reinterpreted in a way that does not end up at this conclusion. 
Lastly, the essay is concerned with the potentiality of statelessness. Rancier (1998) and 
Balibar (1985, 2002, 2004 and 2004) provide us with a framework in which the stateless can 
be seen as a subject with revolutionary potential. Whereas Balibar wants to salvage the notion 
of citizenship by extending it past the state into a post-national order, Rancier is interested in 
the type of dissensus (disagreement) the stateless can stage against the state. The works of 
Balibar and Rancier have been engaged by many including Bauman (1997, 1999); Dal Lago 
and Mezzadra (2002) and Habermas (2004). In order to understand the concept of 
potentiality, the anthropological term of liminality will be reworked in order to show how the 
stateless individual can be seen to be standing at the threshold of current categorical 
boundaries with the potential to move into an alternate state of being. The term liminality was 
developed by van Gennep (1909) and extended by Turner (1995). 
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Section 2: Statelessness, Citizenship, Precarity and Potentiality – A 
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1. Citizenship 
 
Citizenship has always been and remains a contested term. Furthermore, determining the 
confines of citizenship has been used as means to satisfy certain narrow political interests 
(Bader, 1995: 214). In terms of juridical conceptions of citizenship, Duhaime (2015: internet) 
defines citizenship as “the status of an individual as owing allegiance to, and enjoying the 
benefits of, a designated state.” Justice Lavoie (1995: 2) provides a broader conception of 
citizenship as a “juristic and political status in which an individual enjoys full, legally 
sanctioned membership in a state and owes full allegiance to it...citizens enjoy certain 
exclusive rights and privileges...and preferential treatment in access to employment in the 
public service.” Thus, the main legal characteristics of citizenship is that it is a formally 
designated position of privilege that allows one access to particular rights in return for loyalty 
to a particular political community namely the state.  
Although the legal definition has remained standard, within political thought there is very 
little consensus as to the content of citizenship. Whereas in the era of monarchies debates 
were on issues such as the distinction between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘subject’, in contemporary 
politics tensions are concentrated on the issue of who is included and who is excluded 
(Baubock, 1994: 242). In particular, growing multiculturalism and diversity within states and 
territorial pressures of globalisation have sparked the re-examination of citizenship as a 
political concept (Kymlicka, 2009: 227).  
Bodin (1945: 158) defines a citizen as “one who enjoys the common liberty and protection of 
authority.” Thus citizenship is the mechanism through which common liberty is attained and 
protected through the authority of the state. Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 12) and Cohen 
(1999: 231) identify three main elements of citizenship. The first is the legal perspective 
discussed above that is characterised by civil, political and social rights. Secondly, citizenship 
is concerned with political activity and the ways in which citizens as political agents 
participate in political institutions. Thirdly, citizenship refers to an identity conferred on to 
citizens as members of a political community. This is an important account of what it means 
to be a citizen. Dominant rights discourse often masks the relevance of citizenship to political 
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participation and access to and engagement in institutions. Further, the link between identity 
and citizenship needs to be fore-grounded more. Citizenship is not only important for the 
rights it confers and the participation it allows, but also for the sense of belonging it gives 
people and the crucial impact it has on how one forms and understands identity.  
Walzer (1989) and Pocock (1995) introduce a binary conception of citizenship, republican 
versus liberal. Republican citizenship is founded on notions of public virtue and political 
participation. This is a non-instrumental, performative conception of citizenship that 
foregrounds the necessity of political rights. On the other hand the liberal conception of 
citizenship places emphasis on the instrumental and political aspects of citizenship. The 
liberal conception of citizenship foregrounds civil rights and the protection from the state that 
is required to protect them. Importantly, under the liberal frame of analysis, citizenship is a 
‘means’ towards achieving a particular democratic political community; citizenship is not a 
good in itself (Pocock, 1995: 34).  
Walzer (1989:211) defines a citizen as one who is “a member of a political community.” The 
membership within a particular community entitles one to both prerogatives and 
responsibilities that are attached to membership. He traces the origin of the concept of 
citizenship to the neoclassical interpretation of Greek and Roman republicanism as well as 
juridical origins in Roman law. For Walzer, the height of citizenship ideology emerges during 
the French Revolution.  He argues that fundamental to the French Revolution was an attempt 
to establish citizenship as the dominant identity of every Frenchman above previous 
identifications such as religion, caste, estate and family (Walzer, 1989: 214). During this 
period in particular, the concept of a citoyen was closely linked to the concepts of virtue and 
public spirit. Hence, there was a predominantly positive conception of citizenship that 
entailed the political activity of citizens; every citizen had a duty to serve the community. 
Rousseau (1762) and Kant (1795) are fundamental theorists in understanding the modern 
philosophical grounding of citizenship. In Rousseau’s The Social Contract the citizen is one 
who is free and participates in making the laws that he will subsequently obey. The political 
community is characterised by those who actively participate in public assemblies and who 
derive happiness from their active participation. In fact, Rousseau doubts that the Republic 
can be successful if the majority of people do not find greater pleasure in the public sphere as 
opposed to the private sphere. Walzer (1989: 212) makes an important point about the tension 
between civil society and citizenship. Men and women were drawn to the sphere of 
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entrepreneurship, love and familial relations. However, the more invested individuals are in 
civil society, the less time they have to be active in political community. Activity within civil 
society draws individuals away from their citishenship obligations. Thus, to retain the virtue 
of citizenship, civil society had to be either repressed or limited greatly in scope and appeal 
(Walzer. 1989: 214).  
In the Jacobin context, citizenship and virtue required the eradication of “bourgeoisie values” 
which include industry, competition and self-enjoyment (Miller, 2008: 374). Marx (1843: 
254) then theorised that modern civil society produces “self-alienated, natural and spiritual 
individuality.” Attempts to synonymise ‘political life’ with ‘real life’ fail during the onset of 
modernity. Walzer argues that the ancient regimes too had tensions between the civic and the 
familial even though active participation was at much greater percentages than now. He notes 
that the ‘minimal range of social differentiation’ within ancient regimes made it easier for 
men to devote their lives to public service. The limited distinction between private and 
public, with even the realm of religion being uplifted into a public sphere resulted in the 
primacy of citizenship within the self-conception of citizens (Walzer, 1989: 216). There was 
an expectation that all citizens would literally hold office at one point or another. Again, the 
scale of the ancient cities made such an expectation possible of the rotation of office-holders. 
There are a number of changes that occur that require the changing conception of citizenship. 
The first is that the modern bourgeoisie state is characterised by ‘imperial inclusiveness’. 
Citizenship is granted to a larger number of individuals, for example, Rome expands 
citizenship to its entire captured people which alters the political and legal realities of 
citizenship (Miller, 2008: 376). The focus of citizenship became the rights and entitlements 
that passive citizens had guaranteed and protected by states. The protection of law was more 
important that being an active participant in its derivation and execution. As a result of the 
decreased expectations of citizenship, Walzer argues that it was easy to extend citizenship to 
increased numbers of individuals who were of different ethnic, religious and political norms. 
Citizenship moved from being a central determiner of the good life to being “but occasional 
identity, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life” (Walzer, 1989:215). 
How does statelessness fit into this binary representation of citizenship? At the most basic 
level, statelessness represents the other of citizenship. Statelessness is a legal category that is 
in a relationship of opposition with citizenship. Although statelessness is often defined as the 
lack of nationality/citizenship, it would be more apt to describe statelessness as the lack of 
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what nationality and citizenship represent. Thus, statelessness is a lack of both the normative 
and instrumental elements of citizenship. 
2.1.1. Citizenship and Class: Marxist Critique 
 
The notion of citizenship is associated to a particular understanding of class relations. The 
qualification of inclusion and exclusion correlate with the divide between the wealthy and the 
poor with the former being included and the latter excluded. The problem of qualification is 
expounded on in Marxist discourses which breaks down the ways in which citizenship is 
implicated in maintaining the dominance of the privileged over the working class. 
 
Marxism is often thought of associating citizenship and the notion of rights to the ideology of 
the bourgeoisie rule. As such, citizenship serves to give the illusion that exploited classes are 
free and equal. It also serves to individualise elements of the political community in an 
attempt to individuate and neuter the collective organisation of workers. Marx famously said 
of rights: “none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as a member of 
civil society, namely an individual withdrawn into himself, his private interest and his private 
desires...separated from the community. The practical application of the right of man is the 
right of man to private property” (Marx, 1843: 187). Thus, in Marx, under liberal conditions 
of the state “political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society 
from politics, from even the appearance of universal content” (Marx, 1843: 191).  
A crucial aspect of the Marxist critique of rights and citizenship is the limited conception of 
emancipation that they represent. Marx argues that political emancipation is far from human 
emancipation. When one considers the type of social revolution required to restore the 
working class from the alienation of capitalism, the rights of man and citizen pale in 
significance (Buchanan, 1982: 102). If anything, the rights of man and citizen are implicated 
in the lack of true emancipation of man. Marx’s social theory of rights essentially argues that 
the same social relations of production that allow the value form of human labour production 
to emerge, give rise to the idea of having rights (Buchanan,, 1982: 102). Although Marx’s 
critique of rights and human rights has been described as negative and nilhist, there are those 
who argue that it is anything but that. Marx does not wish to critique law per se but the 
manner in which the law is used to perpetuate the interests of a particular class and concretise 
the alienation of the working class. Marx seeks to dismiss the illusion of equality and 
freedom achieved through citizenship and rights. 
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There is a strong corollary argument which posits the direct opposite. It argues that the notion 
of citizenship has a total lack of qualification and that wealth does not entitle people to 
political power. Thus, financial prowess has no effect on political participation. This 
argument is more convincing for the context of Ancient Greece in Antiquity than it is for 
contemporary experiences of citizenship. Despite being non-responsive to wealth at a 
theoretical level, at a practical level inequality and poverty directly affect the experiences of 
both inclusion and exclusion negatively.  
2.1.2. Feminist Critique of Citizenship  
The feminist critique of citizenship focuses on disagreement with both the liberal and 
republican rigid distinction between the private and public sphere (Deveaux, 2006: 52). Out 
of this critique have emerged alternate concepts of politics and citizenship.  Historically the 
public sphere, in the republican formulation of citizenship, has been limited to free male 
citizens who engage in politics under conditions of freedom and equality (Dietz, 1998: 380).
Notions of citizenship from antiquity and following through to the modern state have a strong 
understanding of masculinity. To be a citizen was equivalent to being a warrior or a soldier. 
There also appeared a sacrificial logic of citizenship that asserted that at the moment of war, 
one could prove themselves to be a true citizen by giving up one’s life for one’s empire or 
nation. Aristotle (1958: 1253) claimed that the private sphere was one of necessity and 
inequality which must not be allowed to enter into the political space. Hence, women who 
were associated with the private sphere of reproduction were denied citizenship and restricted 
to the private sphere. 
  
Okin (1992: 60) argues that the unequal position given to the household was based on a 
mythical division that was decided upon in the public sphere from which women were 
excluded. Okin (1992: 64-65) famously challenged republicans by asking “which is likely to 
produce better citizens, capable of acting as each other’s equals? Having to deal with things 
part of the time – even the mundane things of daily life? Or treating most people as things?” 
Equally, Mill (1869:212) asserted that an egalitarian family had greater chances of realising 
equal citizenship than one mirroring the image of a despot. The natural consequence of this is 
that the realm of the political cannot be insulated from the private sphere. Feminists also see 
no harm in this being true.  
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Although the liberal conceptions of citizenship recognise the centrality of the private spheres, 
feminists have fundamental problems with their conceptions of citizenship as well. Liberals 
have an instrumental conception of political liberty that prioritises formal rights that protect 
private lives from external interference. However, feminists argue that such neutral 
conceptions of egalitarian individualism mask the reality of women’s subjection (Pateman, 
1989: 120). Dietz (1998: 380-381) goes as far as to say that ‘male property’ includes in it the 
‘woman’s sphere’ as woman were subordinate to their husbands. The distinction between 
private and public barred women from accessing the public sphere and thus affecting the 
conditions that they lived under in the private sphere. 
There are two main consequences for reforming citizenship in response to the feminist 
critique. The first is that women are recognised as individual not in relation to men and thus 
are included in the concept of citizenship and its benefits. Subsequently, this inclusion would 
draw attention to the manner in which “laws and policies structure personal 
circumstances...and how some ‘personal problems’ have wider significance and can only be 
solved collectively through political action” (Pateman, 1989: 131).  
Feminists are opposed to the rigidity of the private/public distinction; they do not however 
believe that the categories are collapsible or irrelevant. It is important to acknowledge that the 
boundaries around these spheres emerge as a result of social construction which is 
continuously open to transformation and contestation. Further, hierarchical characterisations 
of the spheres should also be resisted as it inevitably results in the dismissal of crucial aspects 
of human life. At the core of the feminist aspiration is an acknowledgement of the social 
characteristics such as gender, class, culture and language which inform the manner in which 
the citizen appears at different phases in history. Politics cannot and should not be insulated 
from the private sphere or any sphere as all spheres have political consequences. 
2.1.3. Citizenship and Unification/Equalisation 
 
Despite the fact that there has never existed a completely homogenous and identical political 
community, citizenship has been used as a mechanism of unifying and homogenising 
disparate communities. In an egalitarian sense, citizenship is of utility, because it has an 
equalising force amongst citizens; “We are all citizens” (Eisenberg & Spinner, 2005: 45). 
Citizenship eliminates all particularities because as citizens we are given equal identity within 
the state.  
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The homogenising aspirations of citizenship have further consequences for the identities of 
citizens. Citizenship, particularly because it emanates from the state, represses other forms of 
identification. Thus, individuals no longer identify primarily by kinship, ethnicity, religion or 
tribe. Citizenship becomes the centre of one’s identity that should inform why and how one 
acts. Essentially prominence of citizenship represents the priority of the public sphere over 
the private sphere. The elimination of particularity results in formalism and impersonal 
politics (Coleman & Harding, 1995: 28).  
2.1.4. Citizenship and the State 
 
Despite the many differences on the exact content and nature of citizenship, there has been 
general consensus that the sovereign, territorial state is the framework in which citizenship 
should be granted (Bader, 1995: 230). As discussed above, the notion of citizenship or being 
a citizen is tied to membership and belonging within a particular political community. This 
membership is recognised with the formal and legal conferral of citizenship which allows 
citizens to then participate in the activities of the state such as voting. Citizenship, thus, 
presupposes the existence of a bound and definable political community (Abizadeh, 2008: 
39). Though the community may broaden or shrink over time, there is a constant attempt to 
represent a common identity.  
State sovereignty to determine who gets citizenship and the legitimacy of borders as 
mechanisms to determine the boundaries of political communities have become increasingly 
contested and challenged (Abizadeh, 2008; Baubock, 1994; Carens, 1987 and Kymlicka, 
2001). In the wake of what is generally termed ‘globalisation’, the physical and moral 
authority of the state has come in to question. Globalisation in this context is relevant to the 
extent that it includes as part of its phenomena increased transnational economic exchange, 
the mass expansion of communication networks and soaring levels of migration which have 
resulted in social and cultural exchanges and integration (Miller, 2008: 371). All these 
activities have resulted in state borders becoming increasingly porous. As borders lose their 
legitimacy as margins of difference, the legitimacy of state sovereignty also comes into 
question.  
The authority of states to determine who may and may not have access to citizenship is 
contradictory to the right of free movement. At the centre of the contention between self 
determination and free movement is the obligation of states to those who come from conflict 
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or impoverished communities and the right of the state to “protect its integrity by excluding 
non-members” (Baubock, 2008: 6). On the issue of humanitarian assistance, there are two 
dominant views. The UN (1951) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees insists on the 
principle of “non refiulement” which requires signatory states “not to deport refugees and 
asylum seekers to their countries of origin if this threatens their lives and freedom.” So, any 
individual who can prove that they have left a life of extreme precarity in which their death 
was likely should be welcomed into foreign political communities. There are also individuals 
who argue for the assistance of ‘outsiders’ based on our common humanity.  
However arguments grounded in humanity generally invoke weak responses from states 
especially as they counter that they have a greater obligation to the livelihoods of their 
citizens then they do the livelihood of strangers/foreigners/outsiders. Also, calls to common 
humanity do not change the fact that the political community sole authority on deciding who 
receives membership and who does not is the state. Thus, the livelihoods of asylum seekers, 
refugees and stateless people  alike remain at the mercy of the state which more often than 
not chooses to exclude rather than to include outsiders; especially those of lower socio-
economic circumstances. Walzer (1983: 47) argues that the redistribution of membership 
could be premised on the fact that some states have more than they reasonably need whilst 
others are clearly in lack. This argument however is also reliant on state decision-making 
regarding both national interests and the interests and needs of the other.  
Critics have rightly argued that state obligations towards migrants, asylum seekers and the 
stateless extend much further than merely the recognition of a kind of common humanity. In 
general they argue that borders should be open and that decision-making regarding 
membership to specific territory should not be limited to states. If we live in an international 
community that recognises the equal moral value of all individuals, citizen and non-citizen, 
and if that individual moral value is prioritised over that of the community than there cannot 
be a rejection of the ‘alien/migrant/stateless’ claim to admission and citizenship (Carens, 
1987: 256). Carens (1987: 257-259) further argues that contemporary liberal theory must 
acknowledge the arbitrariness of the citizen vs alien distinction which is not justified by 
nature or achievement. What is at stake is a re-evaluation of discriminatory border and 
migration policy under conditions of the equal consideration of both aliens and citizens  
(with neither raking primacy). So states are more than welcome to factor in self-interests 
issues such as the sustainability of welfare projects but these must be balanced with an 
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evaluation on the equal consideration of the right to life, employment, healthcare and other 
civil and political liberties of non-citizens. 
In conclusion, there are a number of important characteristics of citizenship that must be 
highlighted. Firstly, despite the prominence of legal definitions, citizenship is a political 
concept, and according to Carl Schmitt a polemical concept that is always in an antagonistic 
relation to other concepts. Citizenship has also been central to the construction of Western 
politics and geopolitical space, and it was a European concept at inception. Most importantly, 
citizenship is always a contested field and its boundaries constantly change. There also seems 
to be an undeniable relationship between citizenship and capitalism with the mutual reliance 
of one on the other. Lastly and crucial for discussions in this research essay is the fact that 
there is an undeniable relationship between citizenship and exclusion. Although citizenship 
has been seen as an empowered position; vulnerability and exclusion seem linked to the very 
possibility of citizenship.  
2.2. Statelessness 
 
In the literature on statelessness specifically produced by the UN, AU and international 
NGO’s, statelessness is defined primarily in its relationship to nationality and the terms 
‘citizenship’ and ‘citizen’ are used synonymously with ‘nationality’ and ‘national’. 
Nationality is understood as the legal bond between a person and a state that enables them to 
exercise a range of rights (UN, 1961: 1). The use of nationality rather than citizenship by 
these institutions is indicative of the close relationship between the bond between state and 
citizen and the emergence of the nation-state. In this research essay, I will use the term 
citizenship predominantly outside of contexts where nationality is used by texts. The concept 
of citizenship precedes the emergence of the modern nation-state and a true genealogy must 
take into consideration the types of citizenship that existed in antiquity. In pre-state political 
communities, citizenship was premised on legal authorship; participation in making the laws 
that one will have to follow (Pocock, 1995: 33). 
As evidence of the above mentioned tendency of the UN to speak of nationality and nationals 
rather than citizenship and citizens, the UN (1954) ‘Convention Relating to the Status of  
Stateless Persons’ defines  a stateless person as one “who is not considered as a national by 
any state under the operation of its law.” Thus, formal recognition is the only way to alleviate 
statelessness. Those who are nationals of foreign states, such as certain migrants, do not 
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count as stateless when they leave their state of origin unless their citizenship is subsequently 
revoked.  
Article 1 of the Convention provides three important provisions under which a person will 
not be considered stateless despite not having the nationality of any state. These are i) persons 
receiving protection or assistance from a UN agency outside of the UNHCR, ii) persons who 
are recognised by state authorities to have the same rights and obligations of nationals of the 
country and most controversially 
 iii) “persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for believing that: 
a) they have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as 
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such 
crimes; 
b)  they have committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of their residence 
prior to their admission to that country; 
c)  They have been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.” (UN, 
1961: article 1). 
These Article 1 iii general provisions that lay out the instances in which the UN deems it 
acceptable for one to be stateless dispel certain myths. The introductory note of the 
Convention states clearly that this Convention exists as the most comprehensive framework 
that has codified the rights of stateless people at an international level for “those who qualify 
as stateless.” Stateless people, who often have antagonistic relationships with their states of 
origins because of conflict spaces, discriminatory domestic politics and their exclusions, are 
not considered stateless if they commit the ambiguous “crime against peace”, “non-political 
crime “or “act contrary to the principles of the UN.” 
 The first myth it dispels is the right in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that “everyone has the right to nationality”. Those provisions clearly define a group of 
people who do not have the right to nationality which makes the right not inalienable and 
universal as it is presented and understood. Furthermore, in conflict situations, states have the 
dominant authority in labelling those that challenge them as “terrorists”, “war criminals”, etc. 
It seems unfortunate that the UN would allow states – the first instance perpetrators of 
exclusion – the right to than label and condemn those that they have excluded.  
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The provision that one will not be considered stateless, even without the nationality of any 
state, if they enjoy the same rights and obligations as citizens is unsatisfactory. It is not stated 
whether a formal or substantive enjoyment of rights and obligations is being considered. If it 
is the former, and the stateless appear as right-bearing within national law, does this 
automatically cancel out the precarity of their situation? The answer is no, as even in states 
which recognise the stateless and confer on them some level of rights, stateless people have 
failed to substantively make use of those rights. 
The Convention ends with a Model Travel Document that it suggests should be issued to 
stateless persons to allow them to travel and live legally in a country. The Travel Document 
highly resembles the Dompas that was used in apartheid South Africa to monitor the 
movement of black South African’s in a highly dehumanising and discriminatory way. 
Although the document was created in the name of protecting the right of the stateless to 
freedom of movement, it’s requirements and prescriptions result in the opposite; freedom of 
movement that is highly monitored, restricted and often denied. 
Furthermore, the 1961 ‘Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness’ states explicitly that 
the Convention seeks to “balance the rights of individuals with the interests of States”. It does 
so by “setting out general rules for the prevention of statelessness, and simultaneously 
allowing some exceptions to those rules” (UN, 1961: i). In the section on Arendt, I will put 
forth her argument that states that it is exactly the provision for the exception by the UN that 
allows for the emergence of minorities and stateless people as a group.  
Article 2 of the Convention which is unqualified states that “every stateless person has duties 
to the country in which he finds himself (UN, 1961: article 2). The UN insists that stateless 
people conform to the laws and regulations of the states they are in and maintain public order 
in a context where these individuals are highly marginalised, ill treated and often killed. Also, 
as with all UN Conventions, the obligations included only apply to contracting states. States 
contract to UN Conventions of their own free will and it has been no surprise that the states 
that have the largest numbers of stateless people are not signatories to these Conventions such 
as the Dominican Republic. 
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2.2.1. Causes of Statelessness  
 
One of the primary causes of statelessness, globally, has been increased levels of migration 
across borders (Buitrago, 2011: 8). Migration has been motivated by social, economic and 
political reasons. Economic reasons include the transnational character of the global market, 
increasing levels of unemployment in certain areas and the promise of employment and 
prosperity in others as well as the possibility of a broader consumer market (Martin, 2013: 2). 
In specific areas in the Global South, internal conflict and fear for one’s life remain pertinent 
reasons for the mass migration that has been seen in countries such as Malawi and North 
Korea. As a result of a boom in what Balibar calls transnational citizenship, migrant-
receiving countries have become less and less willing to allow migrants and foreigners to 
become citizens. 
Gender discrimination remains a leading cause of statelessness with women and children 
disproportionally making up most of the stateless people in the world (UNHCR, 2008: 11). In 
certain African countries, children must be given the nationality of the father. Single moms 
who are no longer in contact with their children’s fathers struggle to register children as it is 
considered culturally and legally unacceptable. Many countries also have stipulations as to 
the marital status required to confer citizenship on to children and their [foreign] spouses 
(Manby, 2011: 4). Although an international legal framework has been developed to prevent 
discrimination on the bases of race, gender, ethnicity and so on this framework faces many 
challenges. One of them is the inclusion of traditional authority in national governance. 
Traditional stipulations on identity are extremely gender biased and patriarchal. 
Manby (2011: 5) identifies the main causes of statelessness in Southern Africa as 
discriminatory laws on the basis of gender, race or ethnicity as well as a failure to integrate 
historical and contemporary migrants and their children. She contends that all these causes 
are related and must be understood within the context of the regions pre and postcolonial 
landscape. The colonial history of Africa is relevant because i) colonial powers arbitrarily 
created borders that often cut through and divided communities and they also forced 
migration of communities away from their homes and places of birth. Thus, colonialism 
represented a mass dislocation of people from territories that they considered as their places 
of belonging; ii) there was a legacy of multi-tiered legal systems of citizenship that were 
based on racial discrimination. In most colonies there was a distinction between racial and 
ethnic groups which correlated with preferential treatment of some at the expense of others 
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(Manby, 2011: 5-6). The legal systems of colonies were used as a mechanism to enshrine 
racial discrimination with European settlers being granted full citizenship and rights and 
native subjects being granted partial recognition and rights.  
Post-independence, citizenship was also used as a political tool to punish those who did not 
participate in or participated on the wrong (colonial) side of Liberation struggles. Manby 
(2013: 6) gives the example of post-colonial Mozambique where those who fought with the 
colonial powers against FRELIMO were excluded and denied citizenship for having aligned 
with “colonial-fascist political organisations” whereas members of FRELIMO were 
automatically given Mozambican nationality. One of the most problematic features of post-
colonial Africa was the tendency to link nationality to proved historical connections to a 
territory (Mandal & Gray, 2014: 16). As a result of the above stated arbitrary division of 
Africa and forced migrations during colonialism, most could not prove ties to the land and 
were denied citizenship on that basis.  
In addition, almost fifty percent of African countries have citizenship laws based on some 
form of ethnic discrimination particularly concerning citizenship conferred at birth (Crush & 
Williams, 1998: 4). Citizenship by birth is only conferred on people of Negro descent in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, both nations founded by freed slaves (Harris, 2001: 56). In 
Somalia, DRC and Uganda and parts of Nigeria, citizenship is premised on autochthony, 
being from the soil or indigenous to the land. Issues of descent and indigeneity are 
complicated not only by colonialism but on the emergence of new generations that have 
parents with different descent. A UN (2013: 12) study revealed that twenty six countries, 
including Kuwait and Qatar, deny mothers equal rights to pass their nationality down to their 
children. Further, some of these countries also denied children citizenship if they were born 
out of wedlock and women would lose their citizenship if they left their husbands. These 
states are guilty of arbitrarily depriving people of citizenship. 
State succession, particularly in post-conflict eras, has also resulted in the preferential 
inclusion of some and exclusion of others. State succession refers to the process whereby i) a 
part of a state separates and forms a new state, ii) two or more states join to unite, iii) territory 
is transferred from one state to another or iv) a state is replaced by two or more new states. 
As new states emerge, international borders have to be continually redrawn. This is a central 
cause of statelessness as who is ‘inside’ the state and who is ‘outside’ is constantly changing. 
Since the end of World War II, a hundred new independent states have been formed. Most of 
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them, at the moment of their formation, used discriminatory criteria to determine who would 
make up the new citizenry. This discrimination resulted in many becoming stateless.  
Lastly, it must be acknowledged that statelessness has also to a large extent been caused by 
technical issues and administrative limitations. In South Africa, for instance, Lawyers for 
Human Rights (LHR) (2013: 14) found that most ‘stateless’ children simply had not been 
registered at birth. These children grow to be stateless adult who cannot engage in the formal 
economy because they have no means for proving that they are South African. The lack of 
birth registration is largely a rural problem where children are not born in hospitals and 
parents do not have close access to a Department of Home Affairs. South Africa also has a 
huge orphan population of children who were abandoned at birth by their parents (LHR, 
2013: 21). Legislation has been developed in South Africa to deal with these problems but the 
problem persists. Conflict between citizenship laws of different countries has also resulted in 
the increase of statelessness. Some states base citizenship laws on blood relations (jus 
sanguinis) and others on birth in the country (jus soli). As individuals migrate to different 
countries they encounter laws that are in conflict with the ones they had back home and as a 
result they become stateless (UNHCR, 2008: 16). 
 
2.2.2. Ramifications of Statelessness 
 
Despite being an overt violation of stateless people’s right to nationality, statelessness has 
other serious ramifications. The first and most obvious is the lack of legal protection within 
the state of residence. Refugees International (2015: internet) claim that the stateless are 
denied the “right to participate in political processes, inadequate access to healthcare and 
education, poor employment prospects and poverty, little opportunity to own property, travel 
restrictions, social exclusion and vulnerability to trafficking, harassment and violence” 
(Southwick and Lynch, 2009: i).  
Kingston and McBride (2013: 5) identify three main challenges for stateless individuals, 
particularly in Egypt, namely freedom of movement, equality before the law and access to 
economic and social rights. Stateless people find it either extremely difficult or impossible to 
move freely. They are denied all aspects of the right to leave, enter or remain in the state as 
this type of movement requires documentation such as passports which the stateless do not 
have. This restriction exists despite Article 13 of the UDHR (UN General Assembly, 1948) 
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which specifies that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of each state”. Article 13 also stipulates that “everyone has the right to leave any 
country including his own, and return to his country.” Notably, these rights within domestic 
law are usually translated as citizenship rights. Thus they are not applied to stateless people. 
The specification of one’s “own” country excludes the stateless as their nature of existence is 
that they do not have their own country. Further, once legislation exists that prevents both 
entry and exit without documentation, the stateless are stuck. They cannot legitimately exist 
within the state and they cannot leave the state. Possibilities to escape depravation and 
exploitation are non-existent. In Egypt, an increasing number of stateless people are detained 
without trial and remain in Egyptian prisons with no hope of getting out. 
Secondly, the empirical experience of statelessness has shown that stateless people suffer 
great inequality and discrimination before the law (UNHCR, 2008: 22). Another 
contradiction in International Law must be acknowledged here. The UDHR guarantees that 
“all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of 
the law” (UN General Assembly, 1948: article 7). But to which law is the UDHR referring, 
international law or national laws? The principle of sovereignty in international relations 
protects the rights of states to self-determine the width and breadth of their laws. Most states 
clearly define laws in terms of the rights of their citizens. This places stateless individuals at a 
great disadvantage anytime they engage with law enforcement. Either laws are suspended and 
they face the worst kind of police brutality or they are unevenly applied and the stateless end 
up in worse positions than they would have been if they were citizens in the exact same 
circumstance. 
There is no direct law that the stateless can call upon. Kingston and McBride (2013: 32) note 
from their research that the stateless are especially susceptible to arrest, police brutality and 
indefinite detention because they lack any form of identification. If a stateless person is 
harassed in the street by a policeman and illegally detained, if there is no national framework 
that legally empowers such a person, they have no avenue for recourse outside perhaps of 
human rights. How do they invoke their human rights when being beaten by a policeman in 
rural Egypt? The onus is generally left on states to ensure that the international human rights 
of individuals are protected but there are more incentives for states not to do so than there are 
for them to do so. Even in situations where national legal frameworks include provisions for 
the protection of the stateless, stateless individuals rarely see the inside of a courtroom and 
are dealt with in an extra-legal manner. Even in instances when the international community 
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is alerted to state maltreatment of the stateless, very little has been done. The UNHCR has on 
many occasions requested access to the many detained individuals in Egypt but the 
government has denied them and that is where the matter has to end because of state 
sovereignty.  
Thirdly, stateless individuals suffer great socio-economic depravation. Socio-economic rights 
are those rights that require action from the state to be fulfilled. Intuitively, one can predict 
why the stateless are denied such rights. Amnesty International (2013: a) describe social and 
economic rights as those rights that are “conditions necessary to meet basic human need” and 
list access to healthcare, employment, food and shelter as amongst important socio-economic 
needs. The formal protection of these rights generally exists in constitutions (see South 
Africa) or legislation. Since stateless people lack formal documentation they cannot find 
employment in the formal sector which is protected by labour laws. Further stateless 
individuals are not permitted to buy property, open bank accounts and/or register their 
children for school. Stateless people are open to greater levels of exploitation and abuse 
within the informal sector which is their only hope of obtaining wages and maintaining 
livelihoods. They make up the majority of individuals who participate in dangerous 
occupations such as illegal mining.  
The lack of the right of children to access to education is compounded by contradictory rules 
and regulations. Every child registering for school requires a birth certificate. In Africa 
particularly, many stateless children are de facto stateless not de jure stateless meaning that 
they have never had citizenship and/or have no documentation to prove their relationship to 
the state. States particularly in under-developed and developing states already have limited 
resources and struggle to meet healthcare and education for girls and for their own citizens let 
alone including refugees, migrants and the stateless. This has resulted in access only being 
given to the extent that it has been externally funded by International organisations such as 
Amnesty, the UN and the AU.  
2.3. Rights 
 
Rights are individual entitlements conferred to persons by virtue of either being human in the 
case of human rights or being a citizen in the case of state conferred rights. In the discourse 
of rights it is agreed that rights are coupled with a list of obligations that one must meet in 
order to keep in good standing. Louden (1983: 95) asserts that “rights are permission rather 
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than requirements. Rights tell us what the bearer is at liberty to do.” Thus, rights are a tool of 
empowerment for those who have them, and disempowerment for those who are deprived of 
them. Categories of rights include moral rights, legal rights and customary rights. Moral 
rights are those premised on moral reasons, legal rights are derived from law and customary 
rights emerge from local conventions (Callan, 1997: 23). Conflict surrounding rights is 
generally based on which rights should have priority over which rights, tensions between 
rights and responsibilities as well as selective application of rights. In most countries, not all, 
stateless people are denied citizenship rights. This means that the only rights they can call 
upon are human rights. Human rights are the rights and freedoms that all people are entitled 
to as a result of their being human. Human Rights Watch (2014: internet) defines human 
rights as “a set of moral and legal guidelines that promote and protect a recognition of our 
values, our identity and ability to ensure an adequate standard of living.” 
Agamben, Arendt, Balibar and Rancier all make reference to the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen in their analysis of statelessness and critiques of human rights. The 
Declaration is a fundamental document of the French Revolution that was introduced by 
General Lafayette (Cohen, 1999: 256). The rights that are espoused in the Declaration are 
meant to be universal and valid at all times; the preamble states that the rights are “natural, 
unalienable and sacred.” Thus, even in the state of exception the Rights of Man are supposed 
to apply although this is rarely the case. Core rights included in the Declaration include 
liberty, security, property and resistance to oppression.  Notably, popular sovereignty is 
highlighted as a central principle in the Declaration. The Declaration represents the premise 
of a free and equal society protected by law.  Despite being inspired by the American 
Revolution and Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration is largely understood as representing the 
values of the French Revolution. Article 3 of the Declaration speaks to an issue central to this 
essay, the link between sovereignty and stateless. The Article says “the principle of all 
sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. Nobody nor individual may exercise any 
authority which does not proceed directly from the nation” (UN, 1948: article 3).  
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2.4. Precarity 
 
Judith Butler in her book Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence provides a 
provocative account of what precarity or precariousness means in relation to human life. She 
invokes Levinas’s notion of the ‘face’ which represents “the Other that makes an ethical 
demand on me” (Butler, 2006:131). Butler makes two crucial claims about the relationship 
between the insider, represented in this research essay as the citizen, and the other, 
represented by the stateless. The first is that in relation to the ‘face’/the other, the included is 
exposed as the “usurper of the place of the other” (Butler, 2006:132). Secondly she claims 
that to acknowledge the vulnerability of the ‘face’ is to question one’s own ontological right 
to existence. Thus, precarious life is life that is rarely acknowledged to be so by those who 
don’t experience it because of the moral dilemma it poses for their own existence. There has 
been an alarming lack of activism for the inclusion of the stateless by grassroots 
organisations, NGOs and the state. Following from Butler’s analysis, this could be because 
the nature of the stateless is that through their own vulnerability, they expose the 
vulnerability of others. Butler argues that the only description apt enough for the face is “that 
for which no words really work” (Butler, 2006: 134). The face exposes the limitations of the 
categories of the status quo.   
For Butler, Levinas is relevant today for two other reasons. The first is that he provides a 
framework for thinking through the relationship between representation and humanisation 
(Butler, 2006:140). It is in the sphere of representation that humanisation and dehumanisation 
simultaneously constantly occur. The second is that he offers an account of the relationship 
between violence and ethics. For the purposes of this research essay, it is her first claim that 
is most relevant. It is easier to be considered human if one can be represented and history has 
shown that the unrepresented are often dehumanised and treated badly. However, Butler 
notes a paradox regarding the humanising effect of personifying or representing the ‘face’. 
The other must be humanised in order to have their existence and precarity acknowledged. 
However, in modern media she notes that the other is personified for the purpose of 
dehumanisation. Thus there are possibilities for what now becomes an inhuman humanised 
‘face’. She invokes the examples of Yasser Arafat, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein 
who were dehumanised through a particular type of representation of their otherness as evil, 
deception, tyranny and terror.  
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Butler notes that “the face is in every instance, defaced.” There is never an attempt to present 
the other as comparable or the same or alike. Further she argues that Levinas showed that 
there can be no direct representation for the ‘face’ understood as human suffering or a cry of 
human suffering. More importantly, the face is not effaced in its lack of representation but is 
constituted in the possibility. Butler (2006: 145) ends off with this powerful statement which 
aptly presents the extreme precarity of the stateless that will be described by Giorgio 
Agamben and Hannah Arendt in the next section – “the ‘I’ who sees that face is not identified 
with it: the face represents that for which no identification is possible, an accomplishment of 
dehumanisation and a condition for violence.” The stateless could very easily be substituted 
as the ‘face’ in Levinas. Their lack of identification or rather their identification as a form of 
lack (lacking nationality, citizenship, rights and so on) creates the conditions under which 
they are marginalised and dehumanised. The representation of the stateless by states, such as 
France, as a threat to national security and the dignity of the state has indeed resulted in 
conditions wherein the stateless experience extreme levels of sanctioned violence against 
them. 
2.5. Potentiality   
 
2.5.1. Political Liminality 
 
Liminality is a term that emerges and is used in the main within the discipline of 
Anthropology. Developed in the 20
th
 century by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep, the term 
was subsequently expanded and introduced in other fields by Victor Turner. Gennep uses the 
concept in the context of cultural rituals. Here, liminality is “the quality of ambiguity or 
disorientation that occurs in the middle stage of rituals, when participants no longer hold their 
pre-ritual status but have not yet began the transition to the status they will hold when the 
ritual is complete” (Gennep, 1909: 76). Importantly the liminal stage represents a threshold 
between a previous identity and a new way that will be established as a result of the ritual.  
In his book, Rites de Passage, where the concept liminality emerges for the first time, 
Gennep employs it to discuss rituals in small-scale societies. He makes an important 
distinction between rituals that result in individual/group change and rituals that represent 
changes in the passage of time. Gennep purports a three-fold sequential structure of analysis. 
The first stage is preliminal rites also referred to as rites of separation (Gennep, 1909: 101). 
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Preliminal rites require a metaphorical ‘death’ through a process of breaking previous 
practices and routines; the initiate is forced to leave something behind. 
In the next phase of liminal or transitional rites, a ‘fabula rasa’ is created. This means that 
forms and limits that were previously taken as given are removed. Gennep (1909: 123) insists 
that liminal rites follow a prescribed sequence of which everyone is aware. In addition, a 
master of ceremonies leads the process of transition. This process is inherently destructive in 
that it is in this stage of the ritual that considerable changes are made to the identity of the 
initiate. Transition “implies an actual passing through the threshold that makes the boundary 
between two phases” (Gennep, 1909: 130).  It is this passage from what is to what will be that 
liminality characterizes. 
Lastly, are postliminal rites or rites of incorporation. This is the phase I would like to 
associate with the potentiality of the stateless individual. During this stage the initiate is re-
incorporated into society with a new identity, as a “new” being (Gennep, 1909: 132). Gennep 
uses the example of initiation rites where youngsters go through the process of separation and 
transition that culminates with them being re-introduced into society as adults. What 
liminality in essence describes is the passage from one culturally defined identity to another. 
The term has broadened to include political changes as well. What remains is that liminality 
describes periods where social norms and hierarchies have the prospect of being reversed or 
dissolved. High levels of uncertainty begin to surround dominant traditions and future 
outcomes may be thrown into doubt. Liminality is characterised by the suspension of order, 
which results in a flexible, malleable state of affairs that enables new institutions and customs 
to become established. Liminality represents the potentiality of dissolving the past and 
recreating the future. 
Victor Turner in his extension of the concept of liminality argued that all liminality must 
dissolve “for it is a state of great intensity that cannot exist very long…either the individuals 
return to the surrounding social structure…or else liminal communities develop their own 
internal social structure” (Turner, 2005: 134). The point about the limit to the extent that 
liminality can exist is also pertinent to the suggestion that the stateless cannot remain stateless 
forever and that they will inevitably stage a dissensus that results in the emergence of a new 
alternative contrary to the state and citizenship.  
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How can we read statelessness and its possible potentiality through the lens of liminality? 
The first stateless people became stateless through losing their nationality after World War 1 
(WW1). They transitioned from a secure position of being citizen subjects to the precarious 
position of being first minorities and refugees and then stateless. This would be the preliminal 
phase of statelessness, what Gennep referred to as the rite of separation. The metaphoric 
death and breakaway from an old position for the stateless person is the loss of citizenship 
and a sense of belonging within the state. In the liminal phase of transition, forms and limits 
taken for granted are no longer seen as the norm. Citizens do not question the basis on which 
they are given rights and freedoms. They do however take steps to ensure that the state lives 
up to its responsibility to protect specific entitlements and protections. However, when one 
transitions from citizen to stateless individual and is put in a position where there are little or 
no freedoms, rights and protections, one begins to question the very basis on which these are 
conferred.  
 
The destructive element of this phase which fundamentally changes the identity of the initiate 
is mirrored in the way in which domestic and global institutions fundamentally engage 
differently with a stateless person as compared to a national or citizen. The changes from 
citizen to stateless are stark as read from the descriptions of both above. This is not to deny 
the fact that citizenship can be precarious as well but rather to note that both the position and 
experience of statelessness are fundamentally worse off and different to those of a citizen. 
The threshold that a stateless person transitions through is essentially from recognition to 
non-recognition.  
It is the potential of the stateless person to be reincorporated with a new identity that is at 
stake in the discussion of section four of this essay. Perhaps to extend Gennep’s analysis, 
what is at stake with the reincorporation of the stateless person is not only a new identity for 
them but a new identity for the context in which they will be reincorporated as well. Section 
four of this essay contends that the stateless individual has the potential to be a revolutionary 
subject that destabilizes the status quo. The stateless person by making demands on the state 
that are thought to be limited to citizens, calls into question the relevance of the categories of 
‘citizen’, ‘subject’, ‘state’, ‘sovereignty’ and so on. Remembering also that Marx asserted 
that in order for one to become a revolutionary subject one has to reach the threshold of 
vulnerability, subordination and exploitation  
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2.6. Non-citizens 
 
The term non-citizens is used as an umbrella category into which all individuals who are not 
citizens in the state they currently reside in form part of. Non-citizens include refugees, 
asylum seekers, migrant workers as well as the stateless. The use of the term non-citizens in 
the international law and analyses of statelessness is an acknowledgement that the plight of 
non-citizens is characteristically different from that of citizens and thus must be addressed as 
such. 
Although the focus of this research report is stateless individuals, in both domestic and 
international law they are generally dealt with as non-citizens. The category of stateless 
individuals is hardly ever dealt with as a unique and distinct category. Furthermore, of the 
categories of non-citizens which includes migrants and refugees, the stateless have received 
the least attention. This too highlights the extreme precarity of the position of statelessness. 
However, as will be shown in what follows, the position of statelessness is seen as one of 
potentiality as well. The potential of statelessness lies in it’s ability to challenge the status 
quo of a global politics still centred on statehood and sovereignty. The stateless is the one 
who doesn’t fit in, exists in an alternate realm in which politics can be recreated and pursued. 
The potentiality of the stateless is the potential to disturb, destabilise and perhaps breakdown 
politics as we know it.  
2.6.1. Refugees as Stateless? 
 
Agamben (1995: 114) addresses the issue of distinction between ‘refugees’ and ‘stateless’ 
people in a paper he presented at a symposium on Hannah Arendt’s ‘We Refugees’. In 
section two we defined stateless individuals as those who did not have citizenship of any state 
whereas refugees were not citizens of their current state of living but did have citizenship of 
another state; a state which they are generally forced to flee for reasons of conflicts, famine, 
genocide and so on. However, Agamben asserts that the distinction is not as clear. He points 
back to the end of World War I where many refugees such as Polish and Romanian Jews 
preferred rather to be stateless than to return to their ‘homes’ and notes that refugees in 
current times who face persecution or unliveable conditions were they to return home. These 
individuals would be considered refugees and not stateless. On the other hand, in the period 
after World War I, thousands of Armenian, Russian and Hungarian refugees were 
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denationalised (their citizenship was revoked) by new Turkish and Soviet governments and 
thus were truly stateless in the international law definition of the term. 
Agamben wants to equate the precarity of these situations and locate both subjects, the 
refugee and the stateless in a similar paradigm of analysis. An element of this, important to 
this essay, is how both conditions of subjectivity are born out of mechanisms utilised by the 
modern state. In this significant moment of post-WW1 restructuring, states in Europe 
introduced law that allowed them to revoke the citizenship of their own nationals through 
either denaturalisation or denationalisation. The revoking of citizenship was done under the 
auspices of rooting out i) naturalised citizens of enemy origins (France, 1915), ii) naturalised 
citizens who had committed anti-national acts during war (Belgium, 1922), iii) Citizens 
unworthy of citizenship (fascist Italy, 1926), iv) full citizens distinct from citizens without 
political rights (Germany, 1935) (Agamben, 1995: 114). As a result of the continued use of 
law by the modern state to exclude significant numbers of its populations, mass statelessness 
resulted. It is at this point, Agamben wants to argue, that the modern-state is emancipated 
from “naive notions of ‘people’ and ‘citizen’”. 
The different theorists that are employed in this essay use different terms when referring to 
the subject that exists in a precarious position outside of citizenship. For Arendt and 
Agamben, the ‘refugee’ signifies the other of citizenship. Arendt acknowledges the 
transformation of the refugee into the stateless whereas Agamben equates the positionality of 
the two as discussed above. In Balibar and Rancier there is a more direct engagement with 
the stateless as stateless people. Although citizenship and statelessness are positioned in 
relational opposites, the former as empowerment and the latter as lack, precarity and 
potentially are not. Precarity and potentiality are not mutually exclusive. I’m going to argue 
that the stateless occupy Butler’s position of precarity, stand on the threshold of political 
liminality and become revolutionary subjects at the moment they become aware of the 
potential they have to challenge the status quo.  
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Section 3: Statelessness as Precarity 
 
3.1. Arendt and Statelessness as Rightlessness 
 
There are three main texts that provide us with the depth of Hannah Arendt’s argument 
regarding statelessness. These are The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Minority Question and 
the paper We Refugees. Pertinent stylistic differences between the three pieces is that the 
latter two were written from an ‘I’ participant perspective whereas the former text was 
written from the perspective of the observer. Arendt herself experienced statelessness for 
thirteen years between 1937 and 1950 (Hayden, 2008: 249). Her texts written from the 
perspective of a stateless person are based primarily on her experience of statelessness as a 
Jew during the reign of Hitler. This is an important point to remember when analysing both 
Arendt’s arguments and criticisms to her argument.  
A unique attribute of Arendt’s analysis of statelessness is the link that she makes between 
statelessness and totalitarianism through both of their relation to the nation-state. For Arendt, 
both statelessness and totalitarianism are produced by the emergence of the nation state. In 
particular she states that “denationalisation became a powerful weapon of totalitarian 
politics” (Arendt, 2004: 269). Furthermore, both stateless and totalitarianism explode the 
state form as well.  
Arendt traces the emergence of statelessness to the end of World War 1 (WW1) and the 
subsequent appearance of minorities as well as the increasing number of refugees as a result 
of revolutions (Arendt, 2004: 270). The end of the war resulted in the end of the empires and 
the emergence of new states (nation-states). Nation-states were an incompatible form of 
government for Eastern and Southern Europe because the geopolitical context “lacked the 
very conditions for the rise of nation-states: homogeneity of population and rootedness in the 
soil” (Arendt, 2004: 270). The Peace Treaties informed the way in which Post-war Europe 
would be shaped. For Arendt, the Treaties are the initial instigators of exclusion that will 
become institutionalised, “the Treaties lumped together many peoples in single states, called 
some of them ‘state people’ and entrusted them with the government, silently assumed that 
others...were equal partners, which they were not, and with equal arbitrariness created out of 
the remnant a third group of nationalities called “minorities” (Arendt, 2004: 270).  The power 
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to rule or the curse of servitude was randomly imposed on different groups through the Peace 
Treaties.  
Thus, the collapse of multinational and multiethnic empires resulted in a multiplicity of states 
that contained minorities within their borders. Smaller groups (minorities) were denied 
recognition and statehood. Arendt argues that minorities were a direct result of international 
law of sovereignty that empowered states to decide who was a citizen and who was not. She 
states that 30% of 100 million European inhabitants were considered minorities. International 
law went as far as to create Treaties on minorities that essentially gave nation-states two 
options, protect minorities or deport them. It is crucial for Arendt’s argument that the 
beginning of statelessness be located in the emergence of minorities. Minorities were given, 
under international law, certain linguistic, religious and other rights. This gave them an 
exceptional status in the nation-states in which they found themselves. This had two main 
consequences. The first was resentment amongst citizens and the state that minorities 
received extra rights and protections outside of the state which would lead to further 
marginalisation and exclusion from the state. Secondly, the position of being a minority was 
no longer a temporary one but a permanent one. Prior to the Treaties it was imagined that all 
minorities would be integrated into nation-states as citizens or be given their own nation-
states and sovereignty. However, with the creation of international minority treaties, their 
position was no longer one of temporariness before assimilation but of being a permanent 
outsider, or non-citizen. The need for external protection speaks to the expected precarity of 
the position of minorities. It was pre-expected that they would not be treated as citizens 
would be under the nation-state, hence the need to protect them under international law. As 
states refused to include minorities as citizens, the Treaties were conceived as “a painless and 
humane method of assimilation” (Arendt, 2004:272). Hence minorities and refugees, because 
of the refusal of the state to confer citizenship on them, become stateless. 
The response of nation-states to stateless people within their borders and outside of their 
borders was the same. Overwhelmingly, states refused to offer refuge and inclusion to 
stateless exiles who were a group that was increasing exponentially (Staples, 2012: 12). 
Rubinstein (1936: 724) argues that states were reluctant to become “a dumping ground for the 
expelled refugees of the entire world.” He purports an instrumental justification for the 
exclusion of the stateless not based on identity or the purity of the state but rather on the 
manageability of the size of the citizenry. Staples (2012: 13) makes the interesting assertion 
that, had a supra-state authority existed that could coerce the nation-state to include the 
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stateless as citizens, self-determination and sovereignty would not have been inextricably 
linked to exclusion. However, were a supra-state to exist, sovereignty and self-determination 
would not be sovereignty and self-determination as both concepts are premised on the lack of 
external interference on the making and governing of the nation-state. 
One of Arendt’s central claims is that the foreigner is the difference that threatens the 
homogeneity of the state. In ‘The Decline of the Nation State’, Arendt argues that exclusion 
is directly linked to self-determination. Self-determination is implicated in the exclusion of 
individuals and groups through its conflation of nation and law which resulted in the unequal 
protection of law between citizens and aliens, majorities and minorities and so on. The 
exclusion faced by the stateless and refugees is premised on their difference from the nation 
(Staples, 2012: 12). Arendt terms this the paradox of the sovereignty and self-determination; 
the fact that they inherently include discrimination and exclusion. The denationalisation and 
expulsion of stateless people creates a new stratum of humanity that is substandard to the 
included, citizens.  
In ‘The Decline of the Nation State’, Arendt argues that exclusion is directly linked to self-
determination. Self-determination is implicated in the exclusion of individuals and groups 
through its conflation of nation and law which resulted in the unequal protection of law 
between citizens and aliens, majorities and minorities and so on. The exclusion faced by the 
stateless and refugees is premised on their difference from the nation (Staples, 2012: 12). 
Arendt terms this the paradox of the sovereignty and self-determination; the fact that they 
inherently include discrimination and exclusion. The denationalisation and expulsion of 
stateless people creates a new stratum of humanity that is substandard to the included, 
citizens.  
It is through the exceptional status and rights granted to minorities that they are further 
marginalised and excluded. Arendt argues that had International Institutions such as the UN 
not created an exceptional status for minorities and rather granted them sovereignty to form 
their own state, we would have a multiplicity of states without minorities. An exception made 
in the name of the protection of minorities enshrined the precarity of their existence. Check 
Israel ref - Arendt guilty of idealisation. 
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3.1.1. The Emergence of the Stateless and the Camp 
 
It is through the exceptionalisation of minorities that stateless people emerge as a group. 
States react to the changed international status of minorities by either i) forced assimilation or 
ii) forced marginalization. The latter option of forced marginalization was employed to a 
greater extent than forced assimilation. Minorities, because of their ‘special’ status are seen 
as a threat and gradually their rights are removed and they are repressed. In instances where it 
is possible to do so, minorities are deported. The state frames the ‘problem’ of minorities as 
being one of national security with minorities being represented as a threat to national 
security and identity.  
It is as a result of the prevailing ‘humanitarian sensibility’ of states that results in the creation 
of the Detention Camp for Refugees. Refugees cannot be assimilated into society as they 
pose a threat to the security and identity of the state. They cannot be deported as they do not 
have a nation-state that represents them or will accept them. Thus, the Detention Camp that 
Arendt perceives as the first concentration camp was created for the stateless. It is in the 
camp of the stateless that the totalitarian temptation emerges; that the idea of total control of 
the lives of others takes shape.  
Descriptively, the camp is a space of lawlessness and then extermination. The stateless 
person in the camp survives under terrible living conditions. They are deprived of all 
necessary social goods that are required to live an acceptable life. They are deprived of the 
structure and order that prevents lawlessness and chaos in society as large. They are deprived 
of the protection of the state and can make no claims for recourse in the instance that they are 
a victim of crime or injustice. The stateless individual exists through lack and absence. The 
context of the camp for Arendt represents the extreme condition of emergency, the state of 
exception. The state of exception is characterized by the suspension of rights and protection 
for individuals. More importantly, a state of exception allows executive power to act without 
constraint towards an enemy. The consequence for the stateless in the camp is clear; they can 
be deprived essentially of life without any consequence on those who deprive them.  
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3.1.2. The Implication of Human Rights in the Deprivation of the Stateless 
 
Stateless individuals, as a result of not being citizens, are deprived of civil rights. The only 
rights that they can appeal to are human rights, which are universal to human beings. Arendt 
likens the appeal to human rights to an appeal to an abstract, naked conception of existence. 
Human rights are conferred on an individual by virtue of their existence, the fact that they 
live and breathe as a human being. Herein Arendt identifies the perplexity or enigma of the 
rights of man. The paradox of human rights is that at the moment when one’s humanity is 
threatened the most, the moment when one’s humanity is fore-grounded is the same moment 
in which one is most threatened. The more human one becomes, the more vulnerable they are 
to death and deprivation. If an individual is a citizen, they can appeal to their political, civil 
and socio-economic rights. However, the stateless as rightless non-citizens can only appeal to 
their humanness.  
Arendt wants to highlight that there is no space for the particularity of individual identities in 
the discourses on human rights. Human rights are founded on universality and the lack of 
particularity of subjects outside of being human. However, the invocation of one’s humanity 
represents extreme precarity rather than empowerment. The stateless appeals to human rights 
because of “the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society” (Staples, 
2012: 13).  Human rights are a non-national form of protection that are meant to check the 
power of the state so that it does not deprive both citizens and non-citizens of fundamental 
protections. However, the organization of the international community into a plurality of 
sovereign states undermines or makes useless forms of protection that exist outside of the 
sovereign nation-state. Arendt (1973:292) pronounces on the UN, as she does on non-
governmental authorities: their “failure was apparent even before its measures were fully 
realized; not only were the governments more or less opposed to this encroachment on their 
sovereignty, but the concerned nationalities themselves did not recognize a non-national 
guarantee.” This is a central element of Arendt’s analysis of statelessness. As a stateless 
individual, Arendt’s primary desire was for citizenship. Similarly, she assumes that most 
stateless individuals are not interested in receiving extra-state recognition and protection. The 
stateless want to be included within the state. Arendt has an extremely statist framework of 
analysis in both her diagnosis of the problem and her imagination of the solution. 
Arendt is not unique in her choice of this type of analysis. The UN’s 1946 Article 6 
recognises the universal right of individuals to “recognition everywhere as a person before 
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the law.” This highlights the international community’s juridical conception of rights, 
citizenship, inclusion and recognition. The stateless individual’s only hope of inclusion was 
at the mercy of the state to recognize them legally. A subsequent consequence of giving 
prominence to the juridical is that all those who exist outside of the law automatically exist as 
extra-legal, illegitimate and informally.  
What is the constitutive character of statelessness for Arendt? Statelessness consists of 
primarily the loss of nationality and citizenship. Subsequently, as a non-citizen, the stateless 
endures loss of legal protection. Through her critique of human rights, Arendt is adamant the 
stateless individual is a rightless individual. Furthermore, socially, the stateless experience a 
loss of community. They live a superfluous livelihood grounded on being unwanted and 
unauthorized. Importantly, and contested by other theorists that will be engaged in the next 
section of this essay, Arendt asserts that the stateless cannot participate in political action. In 
order to act politically for her, one must be a recognized part of a political community, which 
the stateless are not. Thus, the stateless individual (who is the bearer of human rights) is the 
most dehumanised and vulnerable subject.  
Controversially, Arendt likens the position of the stateless person to that of the “savage” in 
Africa. She goes as far as to say, the emergence of statelessness represents the explosion of 
Africa into Europe, the Africanisation of Europe. Arendt constructs this racist assertion in the 
context of colonialism. Africans were perceived by Europeans, during this period, as are pre-
political or naturally stateless persons. The entire continent consisted of individuals without a 
political community who were included into the colonized territory through limited 
recognition from the colonizer. Colonialism developed dual legal systems – one for citizen 
and one for colonial subjects. (Mamdani, 1996: 68). 
With the colonial experience, mechanisms of coercion, power and violence of exploitation 
and manipulation become used in the colonial metropolis. There occurs an 
internationalization of the racist politics from colonies to the colonial states. The totalitarian 
state, which emerges from the temptation of the camp, is the internalized colonial state for 
Arendt. Migrants are the new barbarians, the new inferior other that is a national threat. They 
represent a regression from civilization to barbarism.  
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3.1.3. Arendt’s Solution to the Problem of Statelessness 
 
Arendt would have it that all individuals and groups be given the right to have rights. This 
right to rights should exist as a fundamental right that must allow all to belong to an 
organized political community. Essentially, what Arendt is arguing for then, is the right of all 
to be a citizen. The right to citizenship is the fundamental right. Immediately, one intuitively 
identifies a paradox in Arendt’s analysis. Citizenship is both the problem that causes 
statelessness and the way out of statelessness. Furthermore, Arendt fails to acknowledge that 
the ground of this fundamental right to have rights is humanity. The grounding of rights in 
humanity is the basis for her critique of human rights. 
Also, who will enforce this fundamental right? Will it not be the very same state and 
international institutions that Arendt believes are incapable of protecting the fundamental 
rights of all. Specifically, Arendt argues for federalism, the right of every nation (or minority) 
to have their own state. A European federation, as she envisaged it, is not a state form. In 
fact, federalism counters and offers a way out of the impasse of the state formation. She 
genuinely sees her solution as a way to counter the modern state.  
Unfortunately, Arendt cannot think of politics outside of the juridical in the three texts 
mentioned at the beginning of this section. This does alter slightly in her later work on The 
Human Condition. For her, the extra-legal is the space of totalitarianism. The stateless 
individual has no juridical identity; they are vulnerable subjects who live passive existence. 
She depoliticizes the stateless person. Thus, in her alternate, political action can only be 
reduced to juridical and formal institutions, granting the right to citizenship. Here she can be 
located in the Hobbesian tradition of thinking. Her imaginary is still a statist imaginary; she 
analyses and understands statelessness from the perspective of the state.  
 
3.2. Agamben and the Statelessness as Homo Sacer 
 
Agamben wants to bring together Foucault’s notion of biopolitics and Arendt’s analysis of 
the origins of totalitarianism to argue that what is at stake in modern politics is always one’s 
bare life. Therefore, the category of citizen and stateless are both precarious in that one’s life 
is always vulnerable to external control and manipulation. He begins his analysis by invoking 
the ancient distinction between ‘zoe’ and ‘bios’ with the former representing bare life and the 
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latter qualified life. Bare life is ones biological life, the realm in which wives and slaves 
existed in antiquity whereas ‘bios’ refers to a political and meaningful life which was 
accessible only to citizens.  
The category of citizen in Agamben is part of the biopolitical power. In modernity, biological 
life becomes politicised and sheer biological life informs who is a citizen. The rights of the 
citizen stand in contrast to the Rights of Man. He argues that modern understandings of 
citizenship are grounded on nationality. Thus, citizenship is based on the sheer fact of one’s 
birth into a national community Nationality for Agamben is an extremely racist biological 
concept. Who an individual is, is defined by soil and blood; where you are born and who you 
are born to. These are things that one cannot control pre-birth. Discrimination on the basis of 
nationality or lack of nationality is racist in so far as it discriminates on the basis of the nature 
of one’s identity. Thus, not only is citizenship an expression of biopolitical power but the 
exclusion of the foreigner/the stateless is a biopolitical exclusion. 
The central figure of Agamben’s analysis and the title of his book is Homo Sacer.  Homo 
Sacer is “one who can be killed but not sacrificed” (Agamben, 1998: 32). The reason that 
homo sacer cannot be sacrificed is because sacrifices must have value and represent a loss to 
the one who is making the sacrifice in order to be accepted by the gods. Thus, because of his 
lack of value, homo sacer is only worthy of being killed and not sacrificed. Not only can 
homo sacer be killed at any time but he can be killed with impunity meaning that there is no 
punishment for his death. There is neither legal nor divine protection for homo sacer which 
then places him in a peculiar position both within and outside the law. He exists within the 
law in that he is a subject of the sovereign and must obey its laws but he exists outside the 
law as well as his death will have no legal recourse or punishment. Therefore the figure of 
homo sacer represents bare life that was at stake in classical times. 
In modernity, there is a “growing inclusion of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and 
calculations of power”. This is what Foucault calls biopolitics (Agamben, 1998: 119).  The 
emergence of biopolitics represents an emergence of a new type of subjectivisation. Three 
things happen, i) individuals objectify themselves, ii) they constitute themselves as a subject 
that iii) is bound to a power of external control. Agamben notes that although Karl Lowith 
described the central aspect of totalitarianism as being the politicisation of life, the same 
could be said of democracy and thus there is a contiguity between the two (Agamben, 1998: 
120).  
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Another crucial claim made by Agamben is that the zone of distinction between the sovereign 
state and the state of exception is no longer clear. Within a state of exception e.g. war, laws 
are suspended and the sovereign is permitted to act outside of the law in terms of making the 
decision to kill, thanatopolitics. During the normal state of affairs, sovereign states make 
decisions based on life, biopolitics. In modern democracies nation states move malleably 
between zones and so the border between the two has become almost unrecognisable 
according to Agamben. The paradox of modern democracy is that “he who will later appear 
as the bearer of rights and according to a curious oxymoron, as the new sovereign subject can 
only be constituted as such through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation 
of corpus, bare life, in himself” (Agamben, 1998: 124). Essentially what Agamben is saying 
that, the more one desires to become a citizen or inscribed as part of the state, the more one 
opens up ones bare life to harm. Thus, for Agamben, the solution for the stateless would not 
be to pursue the right to have rights or a type of federal system as suggested by Arendt, as 
this would only further increase their precarity as their lives would be formally tied to the 
mercy of the modern-nation state. The increase of liberties and rights happens at the same 
time as the tacit inscription of individuals lives with the state order. Once the fundamental 
referent becomes bare life than all traditional political distinctions lose clarity. Thus, the jump 
from stateless person to citizen does not represent an increase in freedom and liberties as 
most stateless people would think (Agamben, 1998: 168). 
3.2.1. Agamben’s Critique of Human Rights 
 
In his essay Beyond Human Rights, Agamben (1993: 41) argues that “in the system of the 
nation state, so called sacred and inalienable human rights are revealed to be without any 
protection precisely when it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights of the citizens 
of a state.” Though Agamben speaks of the ‘refugee’ and not the stateless, his definition of 
refugee includes the stateless as he conceives of refugees as all those without citizenship. He 
rightly identifies that the position of refugee/stateless has always been considered a 
temporary condition that would ultimately result in the naturalization or repatriation of 
individuals into a state. This is because the law of any state cannot fully include an individual 
if they exist merely as a human being and not as a citizen. Pocock (1995: 33) aptly notes that 
the status of citizenship bestows on individuals full membership in a community. One has to 
be a citizen to fully enjoy freedoms and rights within the modern nation-state.  
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Thus, Agamben argues that the refugee is a “limit concept” in terms of the crisis it poses to 
the principles of the nation-state and the necessity it creates for the emergence of new 
categories for the understanding of belonging and the conferral and protection of rights.  The 
modern-state faces a predicament of large numbers of non-citizens including both those who 
have nationalities of origin and those who have never had citizenship of any state. Boever 
(2006: 142-143) notes that not all non-citizens wish to be naturalized or repatriated. Some 
seek merely the protection of the state from harm and the freedom to pursue personal goals. 
However, as noted earlier by Agamben, such protection can only exist for the citizen and thus 
all de facto and de jure stateless people find themselves in extremely precarious situations in 
which not only their livelihoods but often their lives are at stake.  
Most of the attention and activism surrounding statelessness has emerged from the League of 
Nations and the United Nations. Efforts from these institutions include the 1921 Nansen 
Bureau for Russian and Armenian Refugees, 1936 High Commission for Refugees from 
Germany, 1938 Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, 1946 International Refugee 
Organisation of the UN and the 1951 High Commission for Refugees (Agamben, 1995: 115). 
However, these institutional mechanisms all highlight that their efforts have only 
humanitarian and social and not political character. Naturally, in an international system of 
states premised on sovereignty, it is important for organisations such as the UN to foreground 
that they do not have a political agenda and respect as supreme the sovereignty of individual 
states. Agamben notes that, although there have been individual success stories of stateless 
persons who have been given assistance by the UN, international law has failed to deal with 
statelessness as a mass phenomenon. He goes as far as to say that international institutions do 
not have the capability to deal with the phenomenon of statelessness. Statelessness is engaged 
primarily by the police and humanitarian organisations because multi-state and state politics 
cannot overcome the hurdle of sovereignty. 
Agamben (1993: 47) ends his critique of human rights by envisioning a political community 
guided by the refugium (refuge) of the singular and not the ius (right) of the citizen.  In ‘The 
Decline of the Nation State’, Arendt argues that exclusion is directly linked to self-
determination. Self-determination is implicated in the exclusion of individuals and groups 
through its conflation of nation and law which resulted in the unequal protection of law 
between citizens and aliens, majorities and minorities and so on. The exclusion faced by the 
stateless and refugees is premised on their difference from the nation (Staples, 2012: 12). 
Arendt terms this the paradox of the sovereignty and self-determination; the fact that they 
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inherently include discrimination and exclusion. The denationalisation and expulsion of 
stateless people creates a new stratum of humanity that is substandard to the included 
citizens.  
3.2.2. Consequences of Agamben 
 
Primarily, Agamben has been criticized as being a nilhist. Thus, academics have argued that 
at the end of Agamben’s thought, one is left only with the option of inoperativity; the choice 
to do nothing. De Boever (2006: 144) states that Agamben’s thought aims not to destroy the 
law but rather lead to its deactivation and inactivity. De Boever sees this as being another 
potential use of the law, its non-use and discusses further the alternate reading of Agamben 
that emerges from this. Kalyvas (2005: 109) notes two dominant arguments concerning rights 
in the work of Agamben that “uneasily coexist”. The first is that citizens must be divested of 
their rights by the state in order to become ‘bare life’ that can be killed sans legal 
consequences. Secondly, he argues that the conferral of rights on citizens is a constitutive 
operation through which the state exercises biopolitical power over the bare life of citizens. 
Herein lies the slight inconsistency that Kalyvas (2005: 117) wishes to reveal. The nation 
state divests its citizens of rights (in order to kill them) and gives its citizens rights (in order 
to kill them). Thus for Agamben, it is irrelevant whether one has citizenship or not, as the 
state’s biopolitical power over the life of individuals is applicable to both citizens and non-
citizens. Formulated differently, it does not matter whether or not one has rights; one is 
always vulnerable to the biopolitics and thanatopolitics of the state.   
In addition, Agamben concludes that a new “nonstatal and nonjuridical” politics will emerge. 
De Boever and Kalyvas both rightly note that the consequence of permanent extralegal 
inclusion is a permanent state of exception, even if it exists in a context without a state or 
sovereign. This is problematic as the state of exception is the very thing that Agamben has 
been criticising in Homo Sacer and other works. How then would it be helpful to escape the 
precarity of the state of exception by normalising and instituting a permanent position of 
exceptionalism for all. Unlike Rancier, who will be discussed in the next section, Agamben 
does not provide enough information as to how the removal of the state will create better 
conditions of inclusion and belonging. Also, unlike Rancier, in Agamben, citizens and 
stateless people have no agency as subjects; there is no form of resistance or revolutionary 
project that can change their position. For as long as an individual lives under a nation-state 
they are doomed. This is the weakness of Agamben’s weakness. 
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The consequences of such an analysis, for the project of addressing statelessness, are bleak. 
The international strategy for combating citizenship has always been to encourage states to 
legally include migrants, refugees and stateless people. What is the utility of such a strategy if 
citizenship is the mechanism through which states have control over our bare life?  In ‘The  
Time That Remains’, Agamben  (2005:51) states that challenging the division of categories is 
important in that it “it forces us to think about the question of the universal and the particular 
in a completely new way, not only in logic, but also in ontology and politics.” However, he 
does not do enough to extend this argument to provide us with a suggestion of what this ‘new 
way’ might look like. 
De Boever argues that in actual fact what Agamben is arguing for is the inoperativity of the 
law. The law is a problem primarily because the sovereign is both part of the law and outside 
the law, as put by De Boever (2006:154) “the law is legitimised by and can be ignored by the 
sovereign.” Agamben realises in later works that we cannot do without law either and 
therefore our only choice is to have the law in place but have it be inoperative. De Boever 
(2006:155) claims that “inoperativity cannot be articulated within the limits of political 
science” as a political force. Esposito (1988: 23) proposed the term “impolitico” to describe a 
condition of impossibility within politics for particular political institution and practice. Thus 
when Agamben refers to ‘those not without rights’ as opposed to ‘those with rights ‘or ‘those 
without rights, it does not result in an inarticulate condition as it does in political science. De 
Boever (2006: 155) asserts that ‘those without rights’ constitute Agamben’s coming 
community; an essential element of what he calls Agamben’s literary-political imagination. 
The state is heavily implicated in the manner that we are all treated as being ‘not without 
rights’ or ‘non-non-Jews’, non-non-Migrants and so on. Butler argues that the state only sees 
binaries. Thus, you are a citizen or a non-citizen, a terrorist or non-terrorist. However, in the 
moment of action when one is a non-non-terrorist, the state acts in a way as to determine on 
which side of the binary you belong. Thus, Muslims are targeted as being terrorists because, 
well, they might be terrorists and they may not be but in the name of ‘protection’ the state 
makes the executive decision to execute and target those whose identities they are not quite 
sure of. The aspiration for Agamben is to solve the problem of the division of division. How 
can the state respond to those who fall on neither side of the line, not terrorist and not not 
terrorist i.e. the non-non-terrorist? Thus, at the moment that we are all neither citizen nor non-
citizen we are all potential victims of state violence under the guise of protection, we are all 
potential inmates of detention centres and camps.  
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Section 4: Statelessness as Potentiality 
 
Despite claims by Agamben and Arendt that statelessness is a position of complete precarity 
wherein no instrumental political action can take place, there are those who argue the 
opposite. It has already been noted as a limitation of Agamben’s and Arendt’s work that they 
rob the stateless of agency. In Balibar and Rancier we find an attempt to reposition the 
stateless as not precarious subjects but subjects of potentiality. 
4.1. Jacques Rancier and the Stateless as a Revolutionary Subject 
 
Is it possible to imagine citizenship without a state and would this type of citizenship 
necessarily be more inclusive? The manner in which the modern state and the notion of 
sovereignty have contributed to the exclusion of certain individuals has been discussed. 
States by definition are territorially bound and thus have physical limits to the number of 
people they can include with their political community. The question has thus arisen as to 
whether or not citizenship can be more effectively thought of and experienced outside of the 
system of modern states. Balibar takes up this question and asserts a post-national conception 
of citizenship. 
In the period after the Cold War, Rancier notes that there was optimism for a “post-historical 
world” rooted in global democracy and the liberal economy. However, this optimism was 
quelled by persistent conflicts that were of a religious, racial or xenophobic nature. The 
subsequent rising prominence of The Rights of Man revealed themselves to be paradoxical, 
as argued by Arendt and essentially represented the ‘inhuman’ rather than the ‘man’ or 
‘citizen’. Following Arendt, Rancier agrees that “the Rights of Man turned out to be the 
rights of the rightless…the rights of victims, the rights of those unable to exercise their rights 
or even claim to have any in their own name, so that eventually their rights had to be upheld 
by others (Rancier, 1999: 62). There is no fundamental disagreement between Rancier and 
Arendt on the delegitimisation of international law and human rights or what Rancier terms 
the “shattering edifice of international rights.” 
The subject of the Rights of Man becomes the subject of Human Rights. This is an important 
claim for Rancier’s argument. The subject of human rights appears merely as an abstraction 
whereas the ‘citizen’ attached to a national community is entitled to real rights. Thus, as has 
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been argued thus far, human rights are the rights of those without rights, “a mockery of 
rights”.  
4.1.1. On Arendt’s depoliticisation of the stateless 
 
At the centre of Rancier’s critique of Arendt is his disagreement with her distinction between 
public and private and her assertion that politics can only take place in the public sphere.  
Arendt identifies political life as existing outside of one’s private life and thus contrasts the 
deprived private life of the stateless with the political activities of public action, speech and 
appearance. Based on an Arendtian understanding of the state off exception, which is the 
state of suspended law in which the stateless permanently reside, the Rights of Man were 
paradoxically the rights of the “private, poor, depoliticized individual life” (Rancier, 1999: 
63). Arendt claims of the stateless “their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, 
but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed, but that nobody wants to oppress 
them.” This is how the stateless land up in the state of exception, the state of war. There is no 
legal framework in which they exist as subjects of a community, the stateless exist outside the 
law as an exception which can then be dealt with by extra-legal measures. However, for 
Arendt, oppression can only take place through acknowledgement in the public sphere. Thus, 
the stateless are excluded but not oppressed. 
Rancier disagrees fundamentally with the claim of a people “beyond oppression”. 
Empirically, he argues, that there have been many people who have wanted to oppress the 
stateless and more importantly, laws that have allowed them to do so. In Arendt’s own 
analysis on the emergence of stateless people, she discusses the ways in which states, through 
law, marginalized and exploited minorities. However, Arendt arrives at the unfortunate 
conclusion of the stateless being “beyond oppression” as a result of her rigid distinction 
between the realm of the political and the realm of one’s private life. If the deprivation that 
one suffers is constrained to my private life than it cannot be as a result of political 
mechanisms of the state. This analysis by Arendt depoliticizes power and repression and puts 
them in a sphere of “anthropological sacredness” wherein a political dissensus cannot occur. 
Dissensus is the title of Rancier’s main text and a central concept towards understanding the 
revolutionary potential of the stateless. By dissensus Rancier means disagreement, 
destabilizing, the rattling of the status quo. In Agamben, zoe (bare life) enters bios (qualified 
life) through Foucault’s concept of biopolitics and as a result we enter into a Schmittian state 
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of exception. Rancier accuses Arendt of reducing bios to bare life (zoe). Thus, biopolitics 
becomes democracy’s accomplice.  
4.1.2. Rancier on Agamben’s homo sacer 
 
Agamben wants to agree with Foucault that in modernity there are ‘positive’ biopolitical 
mechanisms at work aimed at controlling the biological lives of individuals. This modern 
biopolitical power is distinguishable from sovereign power, which generally was a case of 
life and death. Thus, even the law, which in Arendt’s account is complicit in the exclusion of 
individuals, is a form of power in modern politics. Agamben presents biopolitics as 
democracy’s accomplice in employing technologies of control that directly impact the lives 
of the masses. However, for Agamben the distinction between sovereign and modern power 
is not as clear as Foucault would have it be and he uses Carl Schmitt’s state of exception to 
evidence this claim. Political authority is purported in the state of exception according to Carl 
Schmitt. The sovereign power is the power that has the authority to decide when legality will 
be suspended; the sovereign is the power that determines the state of exception. Rancier 
asserts “this boils down to saying that the law hinges on a power of decision that is outside 
the law” (Rancier, 1999: 65). The state of exception for Agamben is directly linked to the 
authority of making decisions over life. In modernity, for Agamben, bare life is captured in 
this zone of indistinction between zoe and bios. Sovereign power and biopower converge 
with the emergence of the modern state.  
Subsequently there is a disintegration of the opposition between absolute state power on the 
one hand and the Rights of Man on the other. Rights of Man discourse gave the impression 
that natural life was the source and bearer of rights and birth the principle of sovereignty. 
This logic prevailed when birth was synonymous with nationality and citizenship. However 
the rise of refugees and stateless individuals exposed the identity for what it was truly 
concerned with, mediating bare life. Agamben agrees with Arendt that the life that comes to 
be taken over by state power is one in a state of exception that is “beyond oppression”. The 
Camp according to Agamben is the space of “absolute impossibility of deciding between fact 
and law, rule and application, exception and rule.” For Agamben we are all, citizens and 
stateless alike, the refugee in the camp and the call to enact rights is useless as both the 
sovereign and victims are part of the same biopolitical body. For Agamben the differences 
between totalitarianism and democracy are faint as both political systems are caught in a 
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biopolitical trap, concerned with controlling bare life. State power is always concerned with 
bare life.  
Agamben’s conclusion of the camp being the nomos of modernity has the same consequences 
as Arendt’s conception of political action. The radical suspension of politics in the state of 
exception (of bare life) is ultimately the consequence of Arendt’s inability to see place for the 
private in the political. Rancier concludes that Arendt takes an archi-political position that 
aims to “preserve the political from contamination by the private, the social or a-political 
life” (Rancier, 1999: 66). Agamben and Arendt are guilty of “depopulating the political 
stage” by disregarding actors that do not fit into the current framework. “The will to preserve 
the realm of pure politics ultimately has politics vanish in the pure relationship between state 
power and individual life” (Rancier, 1999: 67). “Politics gets equated with power and 
power…gets increasingly construed as an…historic-ontological destiny from which only God 
can save us” (Rancier, 1999: 68). 
4.1.3. Rethinking the subject of the Rights of Man 
 
As a result of his dissensus with Arendt’s and Agamben’s conception of the refugee and 
stateless as non-political subjects, Rancier wants to rethink or rework through the subject of 
the Rights of Man and place politics on “an entirely different footing” (Rancier, 1999: 67). 
He is unsatisfied with the manner in which the subject of rights and more crucially politics is 
represented in the analysis of Agamben and Arendt. There is a tension between the rights of 
man and the rights of the citizen. At first, the rights of the citizen are the rights of man, but 
the rights of man are the rights of those who have no rights, the non-politicised subject which 
means that the rights of man amount to nothing. On the other hand, the rights of man are the 
rights of the citizen, the rights attached to being part of a political community. Thus the rights 
of man are the rights of those who have rights. 
Rancier sees this as solveable tautology by defining the Rights of Man as “the rights of those 
who have not the rights that they have and have the rights they have not” (Rancier, 1999: 67). 
To make sense of this requires some analysis. There is no one single subject of the Rights of 
Man who is at once the source and bearer of rights. There is a double negation that mediates 
the relationship between the subject and rights. Rights are inscriptions that do not predicate 
communities; they emerge from the writings of communities. Rights are not merely 
abstractions, far removed from a given situation. They are, as Rancier argues “part of the 
configuration of the given, which does not only consist in a situation of inequality, but also 
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contains an inscription that gives equality a form of visibility” (Rancier, 1999:68). Rancier 
stresses that his concern is not limited to an analysis of whether or not rights confirmed or 
denied in reality. Of more importance to him is to analyse and understand what this 
confirmation or denial means. It cannot be that ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ represent fixed groups of 
individuals. They represent, rather, political subjects that constantly question and dispute who 
is included in their categories and who is not included. It must follow then that freedom and 
equality cannot belong to a defined group of subjects either. The point Rancier wants to make 
is that all “political predicates…open up a dispute about what they entail,, whom they 
concern and in which cases”(Rancier, 1999:68). Arendt sees citizenship as the only sphere for 
the freedom and equality of man. Agamben sees no sphere in which man can be truly free and 
equal. Politics, Rancier asserts, is the practice of continuously questioning borders of 
concepts such as citizenship, bare life, rights and so on.  
4.1.4. Statelessness as a mechanism of Dissensus 
 
The potentiality of the political subject lies in their ability to stage a dissensus.  A dissensus, 
Rancier insists, is not concerned with moral judgments, personal/group interests and or 
principles. A dissensus is “a division inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is 
given and about the frame within which we see something as given” (Rancier, 1999:69).  
Rancier uses the example of woman in the French Revolution to illustrate his formulation of 
political subjects. Although women were not allowed to participate politically, they were still 
able to be sent to death like men were for political crimes. Thus, for Rancier, woman were 
deprived the rights that they had in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, but through public 
action, they enacted the rights that they did not have, “they acted as subjects that did not have 
the rights that they had and that had the rights that they had not” (Rancier, 1999: 69). A 
political subject is merely one who has the capacity to stage a dissensus. 
Following this, Rancier argues that the political subject that has the capacity to stage a 
disagreement is the central figure of democracy. He is unsatisfied by all attempts to define 
“the people” within a democracy. For him, democracy is the “power of those who have no 
qualification for exercising power.” The demos has to be defined taking into consideration 
those who cannot be qualified. Rancier refers to these political subjects as the “uncounted” 
“the part of those who have no part” “surplus subjects that inscribe the count of the 
uncounted as a supplement”. Politics “is not a specific sphere of political life, separate from 
other spheres, since it acts to separate the whole of community from itself.”  
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Herein lays the potentiality of the stateless for Rancier. The stateless are the piece that does 
not fit. If one receives a piece that does not fit in a puzzle, one begins to question the very 
picture of the puzzle. The piece that doesn’t fit challenges the status quo and forces us to 
think beyond what we know to be possible. Hardt & Negri (2009: 84) assert “how pathetic it 
is when politics can be conducted only in the name of the nation.” Through staging a 
disagreement, the piece that does not fit has the revolutionary potential to introduce new 
possibilities and alternates that do not resemble those that have normative and legal 
dominance now.  
The relationship between state, territory, citizenship and the international system cannot be 
complete if there are elements that exist outside of it; even if this existence is highly 
precarious at times. The goal of the stateless, for Rancier, should not be to seek inclusion 
within the current system. Rancier wants the stateless to use their position to antagonize our 
assumptions and principles that have led to the creation of the categories of ‘subject’ ‘citizen’ 
‘sovereign’ and so on. The biggest challenge to Rancier’s conception of the stateless is the 
stateless themselves. Stateless groups have called on international law and international 
NGOs to facilitate their inclusion to the status quo. They do not want to be revolutionary 
subjects or vanguards of a new era; they want the safety and security of rights and 
citizenship. 
4.2. Etienne Balibar and Citizenship Beyond Sovereignty 
 
French Philosopher Etienne Balibar provides the argument for the stateless to be seen as 
introducing political possibilities that extend pass the state and sovereignty. Balibar may not 
disagree with Judith Butler that precarity and suffering are unavoidable. However, in Balibar, 
we find an argument that tries to prove the revolutionary potential of stateless subjectivity. 
Balibar is working towards rethinking citizenship outside of its mainstream conceptions. He 
is a post-Althusserian thinker who argues that citizenship is in crisis because it has been 
associated with the nation-state (Balibar, 2003: . He does not think that citizenship itself is 
the problem and wants to find ways in which citizenship can be salvaged and re-enacted. To 
do so, Balibar turns to colonial and postcolonial thinkers. Balibar and Rancier are both 
interested in existing and alternate possibilities within the modern. 
Balibar argues that, because no nation-state has an ethnic base, every nation-state must create 
fictional ethnicities in order to project stability on the populace: 
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the idea of nations without a state, or nations 'before' the state, is thus a contradiction 
in terms, because a state always is implied in the historic framework of a national 
formation (even if not necessarily within the limits of its territory). But this 
contradiction is masked by the fact that national states, whose integrity suffers from 
internal conflicts that threaten its survival (regional conflicts, and especially class 
conflicts), project beneath their political existence to a preexisting 'ethnic' or 'popular' 
unity (Balibar, 2003: 331). 
In order to minimize this regional, class, and race conflicts, nation-states fabricate myths of 
origin that produce the illusion of shared ethnicity among all their inhabitants. In order to 
create these myths of origins, nation-states scour the historical period during which they were 
“formed” to find justification for their existence. They also create the illusion of shared 
ethnicity through linguistic communities. That is, when everyone has access to the same 
language, they feel as if they share an ethnicity. Balibar argues that "schooling is the principal 
institution which produces ethnicity as linguistic community" (Balibar, 2003: 351). In 
addition, this ethnicity is created through the "nationalization of the family," meaning that the 
state comes to perform certain functions that might traditionally be performed by the family, 
such as the regulation of marriages and administration of social security. 
In his article ‘Subject or Citizens’, Balibar (1984: 1726) argues that it is not important for 
strangers to become citizens. He thinks that the goal of the excluded is to attain increasing 
amounts of “equal civic right within a given community” (Balibar, 1984: 1726). He 
introduces the term co-citizen, which he suggests is the original premise on which citizenship 
was based. What was important, historically, was not the unity of citizens as a homogenous 
unit but rather their relational status was one of equality and equal enjoyment of rights.  
Essentially Balibar wants to extend the notion of citizenship beyond the nation-state. He 
stresses that he is not arguing for cosmopolitanism or universal citizenship but rather a type 
of transnational citizenship. (Balibar, 2006:14) wants to think of citizenship “within new 
territories not in terms of sovereignty” or membership to a particular state or body politic. He 
reworks citizenship to represent a right of residing with rights. However, unlike Arendt’s 
rights to have rights, Balibar’s notion of active citizenship does not require the stateless to 
have the juridical protection of a particular nation-state. In Balibar’s formulation, every 
individual despite where you come from and the statues they had when they were there, is 
entitled to reside with rights everywhere.  
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Balibar’s notion of active citizenship contains a strong tension between the right to have a 
nationality and the right to change one’s nationality. In the manner in which these rights are 
formulated with the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights they 
appear to be highly individualistic (although they must apply to groups as well) and the right 
to change nationality is linked essentially to the hospitality of the state one wants to reside in. 
Balibar wants to generalize these principles in his new articulation of citizenship. If we 
consider the two rights mentioned above as a double freedom of circulation than the right to a 
nationality could easily exist with the right to residency or settlement with rights. Balibar is 
acutely aware of the processes that would be required to institutionalise the type of active 
citizenship he is purporting. He is also sensitive to the fact that through institutionalization 
the right may be reduced to nothing. At the centre of possible challenges to the notion of 
post-national though not cosmopolitan citizenship is the question of “collective authorities 
which could regulate the application of such principles” (Balibar, 2006: 14).  
Unlike Arendt and Agamben, Balibar is also not adverse to the use of violence in sculpting an 
alternative. In fact, he speaks quite extensively of a global civil war in which a ‘virtual 
community’ or ‘community without a community’ would assert its rights to reside with rights 
without restriction. By a ‘community without community’, Balibar means a collective that 
has no common tradition or historical substance (Balibar, 2006: 14). It’s clear that amongst 
the characteristics of the state that Balibar is adverse to is its attempt to unify through 
homogenization its citizenry and those who wish to reside within its borders. Balibar notes 
that classically, it was the institutions of the nation-state that created the citizen and the 
possibility for a civic space.  
However, Balibar believes that the parallel patterns of increased transnational migration and 
increased state exclusion of individuals has created the conditions for the possibility of the 
reversal of the process. The stateless and other excluded individuals and groups reside within 
states albeit with very little to no rights and precarious livelihoods. They exist as a 
community without a community who through their extra-legal dominance of civic and civil 
space claim their rights and from this claim will emerge a post-national alternative to 
citizenship. Balibar considers this a theory of active citizenship in that it is through the 
stranger’s unauthorized political participation that his citizenship exists. The time is ripe, for 
Balibar, for us to think about dialectical transformations that would deal with the problem of 
expanding notions of citizenship.  
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Section 5: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the number of stateless people is increasing yearly. The nature of statelessness, 
being undocumented, means that even the increasing numbers of recorded stateless 
individuals are highly underestimated. Although there has been activism geared towards 
decreasing the levels of statelessness and countering the negative effects of being stateless 
within the international legal framework, the problem persists and is getting worse. Thus, 
statelessness is a serious problem for contemporary politics that is not going away. 
The fact that citizenship within sovereign states is the main mechanism of rights conferral has 
complicated attempts to counter statelessness. Within a legal framework, recognition and 
assimilation into states is the only way to transform the precarity of the stateless into a 
position of protect. Hence the UN has focused on drafting conventions that insist upon the 
assistance of the state with regard to the problem of statelessness. However, we’ve seen with 
the on-going marginalisation and exploitation of the stateless that states are reluctant to be 
part of a solution that they feel threatens their sovereignty. Thus, legally speaking the 
statelessness issue is at a standoff between international legal stipulations and state 
sovereignty. As a result of the international legal framework being built on the principle of 
state sovereignty as supreme, it is no surprise that international organizations have failed to 
coerce states into action. 
Outside of the legal framework, statelessness can be understood differently. The critiques of 
human rights are given resonance by the lived experience of stateless individuals. Although 
formally the stateless are not completely rightless in that they have human rights, 
substantively very few stateless people enjoy any rights at all. Thus Arendt’s argument that 
the stateless are rightless has resonance. However, Arendt is incorrect in denying the agency 
of the stateless to act politically both at a theoretical and empirical level. The stateless 
organize and engage within the political communities that they find themselves constantly; be 
it the hunger strikes of undocumented migrants in France or mass strikes by stateless 
individuals in the Dominican Republic. The reasons that the stateless engage in protest is 
because their position within states is extremely precarious but precarity does not mean lack 
of political agency and lack of revolutionary potential. 
In Agamben we find support in the idea that citizenship is not the means that guarantees 
empowerment. For Agamben, any position of subjectivity within the state is a precarious one 
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in which an individual’s bare life is always at stake and thus the stateless should not waste 
their time trying to be citizens as they would be exchanging one precarious position for 
another. However, in this research essay quite a stark distinction has been drawn between the 
lives of the stateless and the lives of citizens. Although it is true that citizenship in itself can 
at times be precarious, citizens can call on rights and institutions that the stateless have no 
access to. In addition, citizens are recognised, included subjects of a political community 
whereas the stateless always both formally and informally exist on the outside.  
However, if one considers Balibar and Rancier, exclusion is not inherently a negative thing. It 
is important to acknowledge that neither of these thinkers wants to deny the precarity of 
statelessness. What Rancier and Balibar do want to do is avoid nilhist and negative 
conclusions that close of the possibility of a politics being practiced by stateless people. 
Whereas Balibar is not against the notion of citizenship and would like to see it extended to a 
post-national space, Rancier is more concerned with the extent to which the stateless can 
destabilize all categories that we take for granted.  
The notion of the revolutionary potential of statelessness is convincing for a number of 
reasons. The first is that the stateless have indeed called into question the legitimacy of 
categories such as “citizen’ ‘borders’ ‘sovereignty’ and so. This is evidenced by the explosive 
amount of literature that has emerged on the exclusive nature of the state and the illegitimacy 
of both borders and sovereignty.  Secondly, if the principle of sovereignty is what is 
preventing the international legal framework from being successful in combating 
statelessness that a revolutionary politics that challenges the very notion of sovereignty is 
exactly what we need. 
Thus this paper concludes that indeed the position of statelessness is extremely precarious 
and that the only way the stateless are ever going to escape their precarity is through 
acknowledging their revolutionary potential and staging a Dissensus.  
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ABSTRACT 
The number of people without the nationality of any state, stateless people, is growing 
annually. Globalisation characterised as increased transnational economic exchange, the mass 
expansion of communication networks and soaring levels of migration has resulted in the 
challenge of the legitimacy borders and state sovereignty. Stateless people have limited if no 
access to rights and freedoms and generally live under conditions of marginalisation, 
exploitation and disregard. The purpose of this research essay is to investigate the nature of 
the precarity of statelessness. Is the precarity of statelessness an inescapable consequence of 
state sovereignty that dooms the stateless to lives of suffering and lack? Or does the precarity 
of statelessness place the stateless in a unique position to develop a new and revolutionary 
type of politics that acts against or outside of the state?  Specifically, the contributions of 
Arendt, Agamben, Rancier and Balibar on this question will be considered. In essence, this 
research essay will argue that statelessness is indeed precarity but within that precarity lies 
revolutionary potentiality to conscribe a new and exciting type of politics that acts against the 
status quo. 
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